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BEYOND NEUTRALISM: A SUGGESTED
HISTORICALLY JUSTIFIABLE
APPROACH TO ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE ANALYSIS*
KEVIN D. EVANS
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the
pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments
are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the
consent of the governed .... for the support of this Declaration,
with a firm reliance on the Protection of Divine Providence, we
mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes, and our
sacred Honor.**
I. PROPER INTERPRETATIVE ROLE
Although historically and constitutionally unsupportable, judi-
cial interpretation of the establishment clause has tended toward
"secular-sectarian neutralism" ("neutralism"). Many of those who
support the "neutralist" position, if not engaging in a selective his-
torical analysis, claim that regardless of the founders' intended
meaning of the establishment clause, societal attitudes and values
have changed since the time the First Congress passed the Bill of
Rights. Therefore, according to neutralists, the Supreme Court was
correct in liberally interpreting the establishment clause. If the
Court, however, exercises its constitutional duty in a way that en-
ables it to interpret a constitutional provision depending on the
prevailing mood of the public or predilections of individual Jus-
tices, the Court ignores the significance of the Constitution, labeled
by Chief Justice Marshall as the "greatest improvement on politi-
* Copyright 1990 by Kevin D. Evans, an attorney in the Chicago law firm of Schiff
Hardin & Waite.
** The Declaration of Independence, para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added). The Decla-
ration was authored by Thomas Jefferson, whom advocates of "secular-sectarian neutral-
ism" look to for support of their "neutralist" theory.
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cal institutions."' Given the paramount nature of the Constitution
and the fact that the document itself prescribes the method for
constitutional change, the proper interpretative role must be lim-
ited to determining the constitutionality of novel ideas and circum-
stances against a constant constitutional backdrop, i.e., the in-
tended meaning of the relevant constitutional provision, rather
than current societal beliefs and the "intellectual predisposition ' 2
of court members.
II. RELIGIOUS-RELATED ACTIVITIES OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS
Prior to the adoption of the Constitution in 1789, the United
States Government operated under the Articles of Confederation.
The Articles of Confederation, adopted in 1777, provided the na-
tional government with little power; according to article II, "[e]ach
State retain[ed] its sovereignty, freedom and independence, and
every power, jurisdiction and right, which [was] not by [the] con-
federation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress
assembled."' Although the Continental Congress was not expressly
I Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803). As Chief Justice Marshall
noted in Marbury: "Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions contemplate
them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation." Id. at 177. Marshall
also remarked:
The constitution is either a superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary
means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and, like other acts, is
alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it.
If the former part of the alternative be true, then a legislative act contrary to
the constitution is not law: if the latter part be true, then written constitutions are
absurd attempts, on the part of the people, to limit a power in its own nature
illimitable.
Id. Although Marshall was speaking in terms of the superiority of constitutional provisions
over inconsistent legislative acts, the same rationale can be applied to judicial decisions,
since "the framers of the constitution contemplated that instrument as a rule for the gov-
ernment of courts, as well as of the legislature." Id. at 179-80.
2 Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 634 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting). The "liberal"
exercise by the Supreme Court of its interpretative duty in establishment clause cases has
led one commentator to remark that the Court has
repudiatied] the philosophy of those who wrote the Constitution, and the ration-
ale behind the great constitutional decisions of Marshall, Story, and many others
in the formative period of the United States. The words of a document like the
Constitution take on a meaning only insofar as they are interpreted within the
framework of a specific philosophy.
Brown, Individual Liberty and the Common Good-The Balance: Prayer, Capital Punish-
ment, Abortion, 20 CATH. LAW. 213, 220 (1974) (footnotes omitted).
' 1 U.S.C. at XLIII (1988).
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given the power to legislate on matters of religious import, it was
not shy to take religious-related action.4
Evidence of pre-Constitution, religious-related governmental
action can be found in The Northwest Ordinance of 1787.1 The
Northwest Ordinance contains six "articles of compact, between
the original States and the people and [future] States in the said
territory [north and west of the Ohio River]."' Article I and article
III are worthy of particular notice. According to article I, "[n]o
person, demeaning himself in a peaceable and orderly manner,
shall ever be molested on account of his mode of worship, or reli-
gious sentiments, in the said territories."'7 Article III provided that
"[r]eligion, morality, and knowledge being necessary to good gov-
ernment and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of
education shall forever be encouraged."8 Although religious liberty
4 See L. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 119-20 (rev. ed. 1967). Professor Pfef-
fer, who is acknowledged as one of the foremost advocates of strict separation, a broad form
of neutralism, has noted:
[T]he Congress did not hesitate to legislate on such subjects as morality, sin,
repentance, humiliation, divine service, fasting, prayer, reformation, mourning,
public worship, funerals, chaplains, true religion, and Thanksgiving. The Sabbath
was recognized to a degree rarely exhibited in other countries; Congress adjourned
and all official business was suspended, as it was on Good Friday.
As was to be expected, immediately on its assembling Congress adopted a
resolution calling for prayer at the opening of each daily session, and designated
[a] . . clergyman to act as chaplain of Congress ...
In June 1775, Congress adopted a resolution setting aside July 20, 1775 as a
day of national "humiliation, fasting and prayer." In that same year it provided
for chaplains in the army, with pay equivalent to that of captains. Congress in
1776 directed the employment of a minister to instruct [the Indians] in the princi-
ples of Christianity. . . . Congress made extensive use of religion and the
churches as instruments of propaganda for the Revolutionary War and the new
nation. In 1778 it recommended to the states that they encourage religion and
suppress vice. A few years later it officially endorsed an American edition of the
Bible, and recommended it to people as a careful and accurate work. And in 1783
it proclaimed the peace treaty with England "[uln the name of the Most Holy and
Undivided Trinity."
Id. (footnotes omitted). In light of this activity, another author has explained:
It is clear that [the Continental] Congress rested heavily upon a religious author-
ity and intended in every way possible to promote as a basis for a well-ordered
government a dependence upon Protestant Christianity. There is no evidence that
it for a moment contemplated a possible separation of the State and religion.
E. HUMPHREY, NATIONALISM AND RELIGION IN AMERICA 1774-1789, at 439 (1924 & 1966 reis-
sue) (emphasis added).
5 See 1 U.S.C. at L (1988).
'Id.
7Id.
8 Id. at LI (emphasis added).
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is an obvious sentiment reflected in The Northwest Ordinance, it
defies logic to suggest, especially in light of the pronouncement in
article III, that congressional leaders of the day blessed neutrality
between secular and sectarian elements of society.9
III. THE BILL OF RIGHTS
Since the Articles of Confederation "reserved" to the states
the ability to legislate with respect to personal liberties, including
religion, many states did so, either in their respective bills of rights
or other constitutional provisions. As a result, a motion to include
a bill of rights in the Constitution was vetoed by state delegates to
the constitutional convention, mainly on the ground that existing
state provisions regarding individual liberties were adequate.' ° In
fact, many influential delegates felt that the inclusion of a bill of
rights in the Constitution would be harmful on the ground that it
would imply the granting of powers to the federal government that
in fact never were given."
Perhaps cognizant of the experience under the Articles of Con-
federation, including the religious-related activities of the Conti-
nental Congress, the majority of delegates to the state ratifying
conventions objected to the absence of a bill of rights restricting
the federal government with respect to legislation regarding reli-
gion. The "omission of an express guaranty of religious freedom
and other natural rights almost prevented ratification [of the Con-
stitution]. ' ' 2 Due to this "public clamor," the proponents of the
Constitution could persuade several states to ratify only after
promising to work for the addition of a bill of rights."i As a result,
James Madison, one of the Constitution's proponents who origi-
I Advocates of neutralism do not further their position by noting that the Constitution
succeeded The Northwest Ordinance, for the First Congress readopted The Northwest Ordi-
nance, including article III, verbatim, on August 7, 1789. See 1 Stat. 50 (1789).
'0 See J. MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 630 (A.
Koch ed. 1966).
" See L. PFEFFER, supra note 4, at 125-26 (noting viewpoints of Alexander Hamilton,
James Madison, and James Wilson); R. RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1776-
1791, at 131-33 (1983) (noting viewpoints of Alexander Hamilton and James Wilson).
12 L. PFEFFER, supra note 4, at 125. Two prominent citizens expressed the sentiment of
many Americans. Thomas Jefferson believed "that a bill of rights should not 'rest on infer-
ences,'" while Patrick Henry, speaking before the Virginia ratifying convention, commented
that "'[tihat sacred and lovely thing, religion,' ought not to rest on 'the ingenuity of logical
deduction.'" Id. at 126 (quoting J. ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVEN-
TIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 318 (2d ed. 1888)).
11 See R. F. BUTTS, THE AMERICAN TRADITION IN RELIGION AND EDUCATION 72 (1950).
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nally felt that the inclusion of a bill of rights was unnecessary for
purposes of ratification,14 drafted a proposed bill of rights after his
election to the House of Representatives in 1789. Once the House
and Senate agreed on the final version, the Bill of Rights was sub-
mitted to the states for approval. The Bill of Rights, which, as
passed, begins with a guaranty of religious freedom (as drafted the
first amendment was the third proposed amendment to the Bill of
Rights), was approved by the necessary number of states and de-
clared in force on December 15, 1791.15
IV. THE HISTORY OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
The establishment clause provides that "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion.' 1 6 The history be-
hind the drafting of the establishment clause lends insight into its
intended purpose and meaning.
James Madison, the principal author of the Bill of Rights,
originally drafted the religion clauses (i.e., the establishment and
free exercise clauses) to read: "The civil rights of none shall be
abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any
national religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights
of conscience be in any manner, or on any pretext, infringed.' 1 7
14 Regarding the need for the inclusion of a bill of rights, Madison stated:
The first of these amendments relates to what may be called a bill of rights. I
will own that I have neMer considered this provision so essential to the Federal
Constitution as to make it improper to ratify it, until such an amendment was
added; at the same time, I always conceived, that in a certain form, and to a cer-
tain extent, such a provision was neither improper nor altogether useless.
Speech of James Madison to the First Congress (June 8, 1789) quoted in J. O'NEILL, RELI-
GION AND EDUCATON UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 95 (1949).
" See 1 U.S.C.A. at 36-38 (1987) (Historical Notes).
6 U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
17 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 451 (Gales & Seaton ed. 1789). Robert Cord, a noted scholar on
the establishment clause, insightfully noted:
Examining the original draft of Madison's proposed Establishment Clause is
also important, if not crucial, in understanding Madison's intent, because when
Madison submitted his proposal to the First House of Representatives, he had no
way of knowing whether it would be amended or adopted exactly as he wrote it.
Unless it can be seriously argued that Madison introduced a proposal that did not
fully prohibit what he thought should be denied to the Federal Government in the
area of religion-a proposition too ludicrous to seriously entertain-Madison's
first draft of the Establishment Clause should show what he intended in the area
of established religion. It is clear on the record. He did not want a national reli-
gion or religious coercion and he said so.
R. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION 26
(1982) (emphasis in original).
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During the course of the debates in the House of Representatives
Madison's religion clauses were altered to read: "No religion shall
be established by law, nor shall the equal rights of conscience be
infringed."'" With respect to this particular revision,
[Madison] apprehended the meaning of the words to be, that
Congress should not establish a religion, and enforce the legal ob-
servation of it by law, nor compel men to worship God in any
manner contrary to their conscience. Whether the words are nec-
essary or not, he did not mean to say, but they had been required
by some of the State Conventions, who seemed to entertain an
opinion that under the clause of the constitution, which gave
power to Congress to make all laws necessary and proper to carry
into execution the constitution, and the laws made under it, ena-
bled them to make laws of such a nature as might infringe the
rights of conscience, and establish a national religion; to prevent
these effects he presumed the amendment was intended, and he
thought it as well expressed as the nature of the language would
admit."9
The next revision of the religion clauses was suggested by Sa-
muel Livermore, who provided that the amendment should be al-
tered to read: "Congress shall make no laws touching religion, or
infringing the rights of conscience."20 The House voted to adopt
Livermore's rendition without explanation. Five days later, on the
suggestion of Fisher Ames, the religion clauses were amended yet
again, this time to read: "Congress shall make no law establishing
religion, or to prevent the free exercise thereof, or to infringe the
rights of conscience."'2 This version was ultimately sent to the
Senate.
The first proposal considered by the Senate was offered on
September 3, 1789, and read: "Congress shall make no law estab-
lishing one religious sect or society in preference to others, or to
1 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 17, at 757.
10 Id. at 758.
20 Id. at 759.
21 Id. at 796. The fourth version of the amendment (the establishment clause portion of
which is identical in substance to the second version, on which Madison opined the mean-
ing) is much closer to the final version of the first amendment than was the third
(Livermore) version. While the fourth version limited its "establishment clause" prohibition
to an establishment of religion, the Livermore version prohibited Congress from passing any
law affecting religion. The position advocated by neutralists is exactly that advanced by
Livermore. The fact remains, however, that the version of the establishment clause that was
sent to the Senate does not remotely resemble Livermore's version.
[Vol. 64:1:41
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infringe on the rights of conscience. '22 Although the proposal ini-
tially was defeated, it subsequently was reconsidered and accepted.
This version of the establishment clause plainly would have al-
lowed for "nonpreferential" religious assistance. Subsequent to the
approval of the first version, the Senate considered and rejected
two other proposals: 1) "Congress shall not make any law infring-
ing the rights of conscience, or establishing any religious sect or
society"; and 2) "Congress shall make no law establishing any par-
ticular denomination of religion in preference to another, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof, nor shall the rights of con-
science be infringed. '23 Before it adjourned, the Senate entertained
two additional motions pertaining to the religion clauses. First, the
Senate rejected a motion to adopt the version proposed by the
House of Representatives.24 The Senate then voted to adopt an
amended form of the House proposal, which read: "Congress shall
make no law establishing religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof."2 5 On September 9, 1789, the Senate adopted its final ver-
sion of the religion clauses, which read: "Congress shall make no
law establishing articles of faith or a mode of worship, or prohibit-
ing the free exercise of religion. '26 This version was then sent to
the House for consideration.
The House rejected the Senate version and requested that a
conference composed of members of both chambers be assembled
to consider the matter.2 7 The Senate agreed and a committee was
convened comprised of the following members: Senator Charles
Carroll of Maryland, Senator Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut, Sen-
ator William Paterson of New Jersey, Representative James
Madison of Virginia, Representative Roger Sherman of Connecti-
cut, and Representative John Vining of Delaware. 8 The conference
committee ultimately voted to accept what was the fourth House
22 JOURNAL OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE SENATE 70 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1820).
23 Id.
24 Id.
26 Id. Because the Senate had access to Madison's thoughts regarding the meaning of
the proposed House version of the establishment clause, which for all intents and purposes
was identical to the meaning of the proposal initially adopted by the Senate, there can be no
great change of heart attributable to the decision by the Senate to adopt the House version
of the establishment clause.
20 Id. at 77.
27 Id. at 77-78.
28 See A. P. STOKES & L. PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 99 (rev.
ed. 1964).
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version and the second Senate version of the establishment clause,
with "respecting an establishment" replacing the word
"establishing."29
A. A Federalism Compromise
Many establishment clause scholars have failed to gauge ade-
quately the importance of federalism considerations in the adop-
tion of the religion clauses. One scholar has stated, however, that
"federalism was the overriding issue throughout the [First] Con-
gress."30 Due to the strengthening of the federal government under
the Constitution, "[t]he framers [in enacting the establishment
clause] were mainly interested in protecting state authority in reli-
gious matters from usurpation by the federal government."'" This
proposition is further supported by the fact that the states of Con-
necticut, Georgia, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
North Carolina, and South Carolina maintained some degree of es-
tablishment even after the enactment of the Bill of Rights, 2 and
that Massachusetts did not "disestablish" until 1833.11
Rarely, however, will one find an advocate of neutralism, even
among the Supreme Court Justices, addressing this federalism
compromise. The result is a historically and constitutionally un-
sound interpretation of the establishment clause.
B. "Nonpreferentialism"
The history behind the drafting of the establishment clause, as
well as its interpretation by early constitutional scholars and the
religious-related activities of various founding political leaders,
supports the conclusion that the establishment clause does not
29 The insertion of the word "respecting" during the joint committee hearings should
not be viewed as intending to alter the central purpose of the establishment clause. As vari-
ous scholars have concluded, the word was inserted to insure that Congress did not interfere
with religious establishments in the states. See M. MALBIN, RELIGION AND POLITICS, THE
INTENTIONS OF THE AUTHORS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 15 (1978); J. O'NEILL, supra note 14,
at 99. "In any event .... whatever 'respecting' is interpreted to mean, the central notion of
'establishment' is left undisturbed." Dunsford, Prayer in the Well: Some Heretical Reflec-
tions on the Establishment Clause, 1984 UTAH L. REV. 1, 26 n.119.
o M. MALBIN, supra note 29, at 15-16.
s' Cornelius, Church and State-The Mandate of the Establishment Clause: Wall of
Separation or Benign Neutrality?, 16 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1, 18 (1984) (footnote omitted).
32 See L. PFEFFER, supra note 4, at 114-19.
-1 See R. MILLER & R. FLOWERS, TOWARD BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY: CHURCH, STATE AND
THE SUPREME COURT 4 (1982).
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mandate neutralism. This fact is suggested by the language of the
establishment clause itself, which prohibits "an establishment"
rather than "the establishment":
[T]he phrase "an establishment" seems to ensure the legality of
nondiscriminatory religious aid. Had the framers prohibited "the
establishment of religion," which would have emphasized the ge-
neric word "religion," there might have been some reason for
thinking they wanted to prohibit all official preferences of religion
over irreligion. But by choosing "an establishment" over "the es-
tablishment," they were showing that they wanted to prohibit
only those official activities that tended to promote the interests
of one or another particular sect.
34
Justice Story, Associate Justice of the United States Supreme
Court from 1811 to 1845, expressed a similar opinion. According to
Justice Story:
An attempt to level all religions, and to make it a matter of state
policy to hold all in utter indifference, would have created uni-
versal disapprobation, if not universal indignation.
The real object of the amendment was . .. to exclude all
rivalry among Christian sects, and to prevent any national eccle-
siastical establishment, which should give to an hierarchy the
exclusive patronage of the national government.35
M. MALBIN, supra note 29, at 14 (emphasis in original).
" 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 726-28 (4th
ed. 1873) (footnotes omitted); see T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITA-
TIONS 974-75 (8th ed. 1927). As Cooley explained:
[Wihile thus careful to establish, protect, and defend religious freedom and
equality, the American constitutions contain no provisions which prohibit the au-
thorities from such solemn recognition of a superintending Providence in public
transactions and exercises as the general religious sentiment of mankind inspires,
and and as seems meet and proper in finite and dependent beings. Whatever may
be the shades of religious belief, all must acknowledge the fitness of recognizing in
important human affairs the superintending care and control of the great Gover-
nor of the Universe, and of acknowledging with thanksgiving His boundless favors,
or bowing in contrition when visited with the penalties of His broken laws. No
principle of constitutional law is violated when thanksgiving or fast days are ap-
pointed; when chaplains are designated for the army and navy; when legislative
sessions are opened with prayer or the reading of the Scriptures, or when religious
teaching is encouraged by a general exemption of the houses of religious worship
from taxation for the support of State government. Undoubtedly the spirit of the
constitution will require in all these cases, that care be taken to avoid discrimi-
nation in favor of or against any one religious denomination or sect; but the
power to do any of these things does not become unconstitutional simply because
of its susceptibility to abuse.
1989]
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The actions of early political leaders also support "nonprefer-
entialism." "Neutralists" often ignore those actions by engaging in
a selective historical examination of the establishment clause. The
historical facts overlooked are telling.
The Continental Congress, the First Congress, and each con-
gressional session since have started with a daily prayer led by a
chaplain. This resulted from the recommendation of the congres-
sional committee appointed by the First Congress, of which James
Madison was a member, to study the possibility of a congressional
chaplain.
One also cannot overlook the significance of the resolution
adopted by the House and Senate within days after their accept-
ance of the religion clauses, requesting President Washington to
issue a Thanksgiving Day Proclamation "recommend[ing] to the
people of the United States a day of public thanksgiving and
prayer, to be observed by acknowledging, with grateful hearts the
many signal favors of Almighty God." 36 Washington subsequently
approved the resolution.3 7 Some neutralists attempt to gloss over
the importance of this resolution by suggesting that such procla-
mations were merely a carry-over from the days of the Continental
Congress.38 The facts indicate, however, that congressional mem-
bers in 1789 had a very different view from that of the neutralists
with regard to what the establishment clause forbids.3 9 Unless one
accepts this proposition, one must admit that the members of the
First Congress "proceeded to violate an important principle which,
only a day earlier, they had voted to recommend to the States as
part of a constitutional amendment."4
Moreover, Washington, Adams, and Madison issued various
religious proclamations.4' In fact, at least four such proclamations
have been attributed to Madison, one of which, issued on March 4,
1815, provided:
The Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States have by a joint resolution signified their desire that a day
may be recommended to be observed by the people of the United
Id. (emphasis added).
31 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 17, at 949-50, 958-59.
37 See R. CORD, supra note 17, at 51.
18 See, e.g., L. PFEFFER, supra note 4, at 265-66.
39 See R. CORD, supra note 17, at 28-29.
40 Id. at 29.
4 L. PFEFFER, supra note 4, at 266.
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States with religious solemnity as a day of thanksgiving and of
devout acknowledgements of Almight[y] God for His great good-
ness manifested in restoring to them the blessing of peace.
No people ought to feel greater obligations to celebrate the
goodness of the Great Disposer of Events and of the Destiny of
Nations than the people of the United States. His kind provi-
dence originally conducted them to one of the best portions of the
dwelling place allotted for the great family of the human race. He
protected and cherished them under all the difficulties and trials
to which they were exposed in their early days. Under His foster-
ing care their habits, their sentiments, and their pursuits pre-
pared them for a transition in due time to a state of indepen-
dence and self-government. In the arduous struggle by which it
was attained they were distinguished by multiplied tokens of His
benign interposition. During the interval which succeeded He
reared them into the strength and endowed them with the re-
sources which have enabled them to assert their national rights
and to enhance their national character in another arduous con-
flict, which is now so happily terminated by a peace and reconcili-
ation with those who have been our enemies. And to the same
Divine Author of Every Good and Perfect Gift we are indebted
for all those privileges and advantages, religious as well as civil,
which are so richly enjoyed in this favored land.
It is for blessings such as these, and more especially for the
restoration of the blessing of peace, that I now recommend that
the second Thursday in April next be set apart as a day on which
the people of every religious denomination may in their solemn
assemblies unite their hearts and their voices in a freewill offering
to their Heavenly Benefactor of their homage of thanksgiving
and of their songs of praise.42
The thoughts expressed in Madison's proclamations are particu-
larly persuasive because Madison, as the principal author of the
42 R. CORD, supra note 17, at 34-35 (emphasis in original). For the three other religious
proclamations issued by Madison, see id. at 257-60. As for his thoughts on the issuance of
such proclamations, Madison had the following to say in a July 10, 1822, letter:
Whilst I was honored with the Executive Trust I found it necessary on more
than one occasion to follow the example of predecessors. But I was always careful
to make the Proclamations absolutely indiscriminate, and merely recommenda-
tory; or rather mere designations of a day, on which all who thought proper might
unite in consecrating it to religious purposes, according to their own faith &
forms. In this sense, I presume you reserve to the Government a right to appoint
particular days for religious worship throughout the State, without any penal
sanction enforcing the worship.
S. PADOVER, THE FORGING OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM: SELECTED WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON
308 (1953) (emphasis in original).
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establishment clause, must have had a fair idea of the boundaries
of the clause.
Other actions taken by early political leaders that serve to dis-
prove the neutralism thesis include the appointment of a military
chaplain, and the fact that during the years following the ratifica-
tion of the Constitution and Bill of Rights, the United States gov-
ernment spent large sums of federal tax dollars, pursuant to vari-
ous Indian treaties and certain congressional acts, to finance the
construction of churches and to support religious instructors and
activities.43 If one were to agree that the establishment clause man-
dates neutralism, one must be prepared to argue that those early
Presidents and sessions of Congress that engaged in activities of
religious import were, although privy in time to the adoption and
ratification of the establishment clause, acting in violation of the
Constitution. Such a suggestion is a hard pill to swallow.
C. Advocates of Neutralism Misinterpret Madison and Jefferson
Advocates of the position that government may not take any
action that promotes or assists religion, even if taken in a way that
promotes and assists all religions equally, often look for support to
selective words and deeds of James Madison and Thomas
Jefferson.
1. James Madison
When neutralists invoke the name of James Madison, they
point to the Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious As-
sessments, 1785 (the "Memorial and Remonstrance") and the De-
tached Memoranda.
Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance was a fifteen point at-
tack on Patrick Henry's effort in the Virginia legislature to pass a
"Bill Establishing~a Provision for Teachers of the Christian Reli-
gion. '4 4 After reading the Memorial and Remonstrance, however,
one is left feeling that Madison's real concern was the preferential-
ist nature of the legislation. In other words, by subsidizing Chris-
tian teachers, Madison believed the legislation placed Christianity
in a preferred religious position.
In his third argument against the legislation, Madison asked:
"Who does not see that the same authority which can establish
43 See R. CORD, supra note 17, at 54, 57-80.
" L. PFEFFER, supra note 4, at 109.
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Christianity, in exclusion of all other Religions, may establish with
the same ease any particular sect of Christians, in exclusion of all
other Sects?" '45 In his fourth argument, Madison remarked: "the
Bill violates equality by subjecting some to peculiar burdens; so it
violates the same principle, by granting to others peculiar exemp-
tions."4 Madison's seventh, ninth, eleventh, and twelfth argu-
ments, which addressed the intolerance, bigotry, unenlightenment,
and persecution that had resulted from previous religious estab-
lishments, also reflect the view that he opposed the legislation due
to its preferentialist nature.47
Madison's activity contemporaneous with the Memorial and
Remonstrance also is inconsistent with a neutralist label. For in-
stance, in 1785, the same year he authored the Memorial and Re-
monstrance, Madison joined Thomas Jefferson "in introducing a
bill in the Virginia House of Burgesses appointing an official day of
fasting and thanksgiving. 48
Unlike the Memorial and Remonstrance, Madison authored
the Detached Memoranda after his departure from public life. The
Detached Memoranda is in Madison's handwriting and was discov-
ered in the spring of 1946.
In the Detached Memoranda, Madison condemned the con-
gressional chaplain system:
Is the appointment of Chaplains to the two Houses of Con-
gress consistent with the Constitution, and with the pure princi-
ple of religious freedom?
In strictness the answer on both points must be in the nega-
tive. The Constitution of the U.S. forbids everything like an es-
tablishment of a national religion. The law appointing Chaplains
establishes a religious worship for the national representatives, to
be performed by Ministers of religion, elected by a majority of
them; and these are to be paid out of the national taxes. Does not
this involve the principle of a national establishment, applicable
to a provision for a religious worship for the Constituent as well
" S. PADOVER, supra note 42, at 301.
46 Id.
41 See id. at 302-04.
4" See Cornelius, Church and State, supra note 31, at 25-26 (citing 1 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 556 (J. Boyd ed. 1950)). Even if the Memorial and Remonstrance could
be said to advocate neutralism, to argue from this premise that the establishment clause
mandates neutrality between religion and irreligion is to ignore the federalism compromise
behind the establishment clause, and Madison's interpretation of the establishment clause
as drafted.
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as of the representative Body, approved by the majority, and con-
ducted by Ministers of religion paid by the entire nation.49
Madison believed that such a chaplain system would improperly
and unconstitutionally impose the religious beliefs of the majority
on those in the minority.50 In addition, Madison questioned the
constitutionality of religious proclamations by stating, "[r]eligious
proclamations by the Executive recommending thanksgiving &
fasts .. .are shoots from the same root .... Altho' recommenda-
tions only, they imply a religious agency, making no part of the
trust delegated to political rulers."'51
Madison's comments in the Detached Memoranda are incon-
sistent with his actions during both the First Congress and as Pres-
ident. As a member of a congressional committee he recommended
the appointment of a congressional chaplain system and failed to
object to the Thanksgiving Day Proclamation recommended by the
House. As President, Madison issued four similar religious procla-
mations. Moreover, the portion of the Detached Memoranda deal-
ing with religious proclamations is directly at odds with a letter
Madison wrote on the subject five years after he left the Presi-
dency.5 2 If the meaning of the establishment clause is to be inter-
preted using the words and actions of Madison, it is far more logi-
cal to utilize the statements and behavior of Madison while he was
a Congressman and President, when he made policy for which he
was accountable, rather than to rely on the words of one document
written in Madison's retirement years.5
11 R. CORD, supra note 17, at 30 (quoting 3 William and Mary Quarterly 535, 558 (E.
Fleet ed. 1946) (emphasis added by R. CORD)).
10 Id. Madison stated:
The establishment of the chaplainship to Congress is a palpable violation of
equal rights, as well as of Constitutional principles: The tenets of the chaplains
elected [by the majority] shut the door of worship [against] the members whose
creeds & consciences forbid a participation in that of the majority. To say nothing
of other sects, this is the case with that of Roman Catholics & Quakers who have
always had members in one or both the Legislative branches. Could a Catholic
clergyman ever hope to be appointed a Chaplain? To say that his religious princi-
ples are obnoxious or that his sect is small, is to lift the evil at once and exhibit in
its naked deformity the doctrine that religious truth is to be tested by numbers, or
that the major sects have a right to govern the minor.
Id. (emphasis in original).
I1 /d.
52 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
'3 During his Presidency, Madison did strike down legislation that he believed crossed
the border into the realm prohibited by the establishment clause. For example, he vetoed a
bill on February 21, 1811, that sought to incorporate the Protestant Episcopal Church in the
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2. Thomas Jefferson
Thomas Jefferson's name and infamous "wall of separation"
metaphor are frequently cited by neutralists. As with Madison,
however, Jefferson's words and conduct both before and during his
tenure as President reflect a misplaced reliance on him as an advo-
cate of neutralism.
The infamous "wall of separation" metaphor, which has
spawned doctrinal havoc and constitutionally' unsound decisions,
comes from the second paragraph of a letter dated January 1; 1802,
from Jefferson to the Danbury Connecticut Baptist Association.
That paragraph reads as follows:
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely
between man and his God, that he owes account to none other for
his faith or his worship, that the legislative powers of government
reach actions only, and not opinions, I contemplate with sover-
eign reverence that act of the whole American people which de-
clared that their legislature should "make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof," thus building a wall of separation between Church and
State. Adhering to this expression of the supreme will of the na-
tion in behalf of the rights of conscience, I shall see with sincere
satisfaction the progress of those sentiments which tend to re:
store to man all his natural rights, convinced he has no natural
right in opposition to his social duties.5 4
It would be grossly misleading, however, to examine a single
paragraph from the voluminous pages of Jefferson's writings to as-
certain his thinking on the subject. Jefferson's conduct as a public
town of Alexandria, in the District of Columbia, on the ground that
[t]he bill enacts into and establishes by law sundry rules and proceedings relative
purely to the organization and polity of the church incorporated, and compre-
hending even the election and removal of the minister of the same, so that no
change could be made therein by the particular society or by the general church of
which it is a member, and whose authority it recognizes. This particular church,
therefore, would so far be a religious establishment by law, a legal force and sanc-
tion being given to certain articles in its constitution and administration.
S. PADOVER, supra note 42, at 307. Moreover, Madison, on February 28, 1811, vetoed a bill
to reserve federal land for the use of a Baptist church in the Mississippi Territory. These
bills appeared to establish a church by either formulating and dictating church governance
and organization, or by preferring one religious sect over others. See id. at 308; see also R.
CORD, supra note 17, at 33-34 (analysis of veto message).
" See 16 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 281-82 (A. Lipscomb & A. Bergh eds.
1903). For an opposing interpretation of the Danbury Baptist Letter, see L. LEVY, THE Es-
TABLISHMENT CLAUSE 181-83 (1986).
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servant is a much better source of evidence.
One of Jefferson's first public acts in Virginia on the topic of
religion was his drafting, in 1776, of the "Resolution[] for Disestab-
lishing the Church of England and for Repealing Laws Interfering
with Freedom of Worship."55 In the resolution, Jefferson proposed
that "no pre-eminence may be allowed to any one Religious sect
over another" and advocated the abolition of coercive levies to
support the Church of England. 6 Jefferson noted that the purpose
of the resolution was to establish equality among all religious
sects. "
Jefferson also authored "A Bill for Establishing Religious
Freedom."58 This bill, which disestablished the Episcopal Church
in Virginia, was designed to prohibit taxation that would both sup-
port a preferred religion and "pay ministerial salaries and build
sectarian edifices for all religions."59 The bill, it could be argued,
prohibited preferentialism as well as impracticable nonpreferential
assistance (i.e., nonpreferential assistance that is impracticable due
to monetary or other considerations which would make it impossi-
ble to treat all religions fairly).60
While a public servant in Virginia, Jefferson also authored the
following bills having religious significance: the "Bill for Saving the
Property of the Church Heretofore by Law Established;"'" the
"Bill for Punishing Disturbers of Religious Worship and Sabbath
Breakers;"6 the "Bill for Appointing Days of Public Fasting and
Thanksgiving"63 and the "Bill Annulling Marriages Prohibited by
the Levitical Law, and Appointing the Mode of Solemnizing Law-
ful Marriage."6 4 If Jefferson was the neutralist that some suggest,
5' See 1 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 530 (J. Boyd ed. 1950) [hereinafter 1 JEF-
FERSON PAPERS]. See generally F. SWANCARA, THOMAS JEFFERSON vs. RELIGIOUS OPPRESSION
passim (1969) (thorough discussion of Jefferson's views on religious freedom).
56 1 JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 55 at 530.
See id. at 531 n.1.
5' 2 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 545 (J. Boyd ed. 1950) [hereinafter 2 JEFFERSON
PAPERS].
'9 Id. at 545-47; see R. CORD, supra note 17, at 36-37.
e See infra notes 245-53 and accompanying text (advocating practicable nonpreferen-
tialism and proper establishment clause analysis).
1 2 JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 58, at 553 (designed to protect property of disestab-
lished Anglican Church).
" Id. at 555.
63 Id. at 556 (set aside official days for fasting and worship and compelled ministers to
perform religious services on prescribed days or suffer potential fines for violations).
64 Id.
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he violated his own concept of church/state relations when he au-
thored these bills.
In addition to his legislation, Jefferson went to great lengths to
ensure religious training and worship at the University of Vir-
ginia,"' and took pride in knowing that the four religious denomi-
nations in his hometown of Charlottesville utilized the tax sup-
ported county courthouse on alternate Sundays as their place of
worship. 6  Thus it should be clear that Jefferson "believed govern-
ment interaction and cooperation with religious institutions was
both permissible and necessary. ' '1 7
Jefferson's activities as President also indicate that he was not
an advocate of neutralism. For example, in 1803 Jefferson asked
the Senate to ratify a treaty with the Kaskaskia Indians that pro-
vided, inter alia, for the use of federal money to support a Catholic
priest and to construct a church." Had Jefferson thought that such
a treaty violated the establishment clause, he could have simply
recommended the payment of a lump sum and annual stipend
from which the Indians could have built their church and paid
their priest.
While President, Jefferson also signed extensions of "An Act
regulating the grants of land appropriated for Military Services
and for the Society of the United Brethren, for propagating the
Gospel among the Heathen."69 That act provided for the place-
ment, in trust, without cost, of federal land in the name of an ev-
6 See infra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
66 See WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 346 (P. Ford ed. 1905).
67 Cornelius, supra note 31, at 29-30 (footnote omitted).
6" See R. CORD, supra note 17, at 38. The third article of that treaty provided in part:
And whereas, The greater part of the said tribe have been baptized and received
into the Catholic church to which they are much attached, the United States will
give annually for seven years one hundred dollars towards the support of a
priest of that religion, who will engage to perform for the said tribe the duties of
his office and also to instruct as many of their children as possible in the rudi-
ments of literature. And the United States will further give the sum of three
hundred dollars to assist the said tribe in the erection of a church. The stipula-
tions made in this and the preceding article, together with the sum of five hun-
dred and eighty dollars, which is now paid or assured to be paid for the said tribe
for the purpose of procuring some necessary articles, and to relieve them from
debts which they have heretofore contracted, is considered as a full and ample
compensation for the relinquishment made to the United States in the first
article.
Id. (quoting VII Stat. at Large 78-79) (R. Peters ed. 1848).
" Id. at 42-43 (quoting Acts of Fourth Congress, ch. 46, I Stat. at Large 491) (emphasis
in original).
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angelical religious order the purpose of which was to encourage
members of that order to settle in western parts of the country and
assist Christian Indians.70 Jefferson's conduct in this regard "was
tantamount to underwriting the maintenance and spreading of
Christianity among the Indians."'71
Unlike Washington and Adams before him, Jefferson did re-
fuse to issue religious proclamations. Neutralists place great weight
on this fact when invoking Jefferson's name. An 1808 letter from
Jefferson to a Presbyterian clergyman sheds light on Jefferson's
thinking in this regard. 72 In his letter, Jefferson explained that fed-
eralism concerns "forbade" him to issue religious proclamations.
Jefferson indicated that he perceived the power to prescribe reli-
gious exercise as being vested in the states, and the establishment
clause was intended to prevent the usurpation of state sovereignty.
What is clear, however, is that Jefferson did not refuse to declare
national days of thanksgiving because he believed in neutralism. In
fact, Jefferson urged the celebration of such a day at the state level
70 Id. (footnotes omitted).
", Id. at 43. As Cord noted, neither of the above acts which were signed by Jefferson
violated the establishment clause since neither religious sect "was favored because of a na-
tional religious policy to put any religion or sect into a preferred position." Id. at 47. The
same can be said for the other bills supported by Jefferson that involved interaction and
cooperation between government and religion. See supra notes 54-69 and accompanying
text.
72 See L. PFEFFER, supra note 4, at 266. In the letter, Jefferson stated:
I consider the government of the United States as interdicted by the Constitution
from intermeddling with religious institutions, their doctrines, discipline, or exer-
cises. This results not only from the provision that no law shall be made respect-
ing the establishment or free exercise of religion, but from that also which reserves
to the States the powers not delegated to the United States. Certainly, no power
to prescribe any religious exercise, or to assume authority in religious discipline,
has been delegated to the General Government. It must then rest with the States,
as far as it can be in any human authority. But it is only proposed that I should
recommend not prescribe a day of fasting and prayer. That is, that I should indi-
rectly assume to the United States an authority over religious exercises, which the
Constitution has directly precluded them from .... I do not believe it is for the
interest of religion to invite the civil magistrate to direct its exercises, its disci-
pline, or its doctrines; nor of the religious societies, that the General Government
should be invested with the power of effecting any uniformity of time or matter
among them. Fasting and prayer are religious exercises; the enjoining them an act
of discipline. Every religious society has a right to determine for itself the times
for these exercises, and the objects proper for them, according to their own partic-
ular tenets; and the right can never be safer than in their hands, where the Consti-
tution has deposited it.
Id. (quoting JEFFERSON'S WRITINGs 428-30 (Monticello ed. 1905)).
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in VirginiaY
V. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE WAS NOT INTENDED TO LIMIT
STATE ACTION
Prior to the enactment of the fourteenth amendment, the spe-
cific provisions in the Bill of Rights were held not to apply to the
states.7 4 During the period immediately following passage of the
fourteenth amendment, the Supreme Court continued to hold that
the Bill of Rights acted as a restraint only upon the federal govern-
ment.75 Through the doctrine of selective incorporation, however,
the Supreme Court has incorporated most of the Bill of Rights into
the fourteenth amendment, thereby making the selected provisions
applicable to the states.76 In Everson v. Board of Education," the
Supreme Court held that the establishment clause applied to the
states.78 One year later, in Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of
Education,7 9 the Court reaffirmed the incorporation of the estab-
lishment clause and the majority's interpretation of it in Everson.8"
These two decisions continue to cloud the true meaning of the es-
tablishment clause, and, therefore, its applicability as a restraint
upon government.
73 See 1 JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 55, at 556.
7' See, e.g., Permoli v. Municipality No. 1 of New Orleans, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589, 609-10
(1845) (religious guarantees of first amendment inapplicable to states); Barron v. Mayor of
Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247-48 (1833) (fifth amendment not applicable to states,
implying that Bill of Rights applies only to federal government).
7' See, e.g., Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 534-35 (1884); The Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 136, 178 (1872).
78 See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 772-74 (2d ed. 1988). Under the theory
of selective incorporation, only those provisions of the Bill of Rights which have been found
to be fundamental to the American legal system are included under the fourteenth amend-
ment. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1968); R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J.
YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 14.2 (1986). The
Court has refused to incorporate the second amendment's guarantee of the right to keep
and bear arms, see Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886); the fifth amendment guaran-
tee of criminal prosecution only on grand jury indictment, see Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 534-35;
and the seventh amendment guarantee of a jury trial in a civil case, see Minneapolis & St.
Louis R.R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 217 (1916). In addition, the question of the incorpora-
tion of the third amendment's prohibition against quartering troops and the eighth amend-
ment's excessive fines provisions has never been directly addressed. See R. ROTUNDA, J. No-
WAK & J. YOUNG, supra, § 14.2.
77 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (5-4 decision).
78 Id. at 18.
7- 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (8-1 decision).
80 Id. at 211-12.
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A. Everson v. Board of Education
Everson involved a taxpayer's challenge to a New Jersey stat-
ute that authorized "school districts to make rules and contracts
[providing] for the transportation of children to and from
schools.""' Pursuant to this statutory authorization, the Board of
Education of the Township of Ewing, New Jersey "authorized re-
imbursement to parents of money expended by them for the bus
transportation of their children on regular buses operated by the
public transportation system. Part of this money was for the pay-
ment of transportation to Catholic parochial schools." '82 The tax-
payer claimed that the New Jersey statute, and the subsequent
resolution adopted by the Ewing Board of Education pursuant to
that statute, violated both the due process clause and the estab-
lishment clause of the United States Constitution. 3
After disposing of the taxpayer's due process argument,84 the
Court addressed the alleged first amendment establishment clause
violation.8 5 In order to determine whether the New Jersey statute
was a "law respecting an establishment of religion," Justice Black
felt it was necessary to engage in a "historical examination":
"Whether this New Jersey law is one respecting an 'establishment
of religion' requires an understanding of the meaning of that lan-
guage . . . . [I]t is not inappropriate briefly to review the back-
ground and environment of the period in which that constitutional
language was fashioned and adopted." 86 Justice Black placed great
emphasis on the fact that during the colonization of the Atlantic
Coast states, government-established churches and governments'
religious intolerance were prevalent.8 7 It was to remedy such evils,
Justice Black reasoned, that the first amendment was drafted and
" Everson, 330 U.S. at 3 (footnote omitted).
82 Id.
83 Id. at 4-5. The argument in support of a first amendment violation was that:
The statute and the resolution forced inhabitants to pay taxes to help support and
maintain schools which are dedicated to, and which regularly teach, the Catholic
Faith. This [was] alleged to be a use of state power to support church schools
contrary to the prohibition of the first amendment which the fourteenth amend-
ment made applicable to the states.
Id. at 5.
84 Id. at 5-7.
81 Id. at 7-18.
88 Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
8 Id. at 8-10.
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ratified.8
It is suggested, however, that the primary purpose of the es-
tablishment clause was not the federal protection of individual
freedoms. Rather, the establishment clause, like the free exercise
clause, was primarily the result of federalism concerns. According
to Madison, the religion clauses of the first amendment were in-
serted to calm the fears of various states that Congress, under its
"necessary and proper powers," could intrude upon the states'
power to legislate respecting religious affairs.8 9 In particular, the
establishment clause "was designed to satisfy people from states,
such as Massachusetts, that did have established churches." 90
In support of the Court's position that the establishment
clause mandates neutralism, Justice Black examined the views of
Madison and Jefferson.91 While it is questionable whether Jeffer-
son played a determinative role in the drafting and adoption of the
religion clauses, Justice Black's argument may be challenged on
other grounds. Justice Black attempted to extrapolate Madison's
views on the subject from the Memorial and Remonstrance, while
inferring Jefferson's interpretation from the Virginia Bill for Reli-
gious Liberty.9 2 For reasons to be further discussed, reliance upon
these two documents to infer Madison's and Jefferson's interpreta-
tion of the establishment clause produces an incorrect result.
The Memorial and Remonstrance and Virginia Bill for Reli-
gious Liberty were written prior to the adoption or the drafting of
the first amendment. Also, while Justice Black interpreted the Me-
morial and Remonstrance as proof of Madison's support of an
overly expansive reading of the establishment clause, a good argu-
ment can be made that Justice Black overreaches in his interpreta-
tion of that document.8 3 Finally, and most importantly, Justice
Black overlooked a few details of major significance. No mention
was made of the fact that Madison served on the committee that
recommended the establishment of a congressional chaplain sys-
tem, or of the fact that Madison did not object to the request by
88 Id. at 11. "These practices became so commonplace as to shock the freedom-loving
colonials into a feeling of abhorrence. The imposition of taxes to pay ministers' salaries and
to build and maintain churches and church property aroused their indignation. It was these
feelings which found expression in the First Amendment." Id. (footnotes omitted).
" See 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 17, at 757.
go M. MALBIN, supra note 29, at 15.
9, Everson, 330 U.S. at 13.
92 Id. at 11-13; see supra notes 44-47, 58-60 and accompanying text.
9' See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
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the First Congress for the issuance of a religious proclamation. Nor
did Justice Black refer to the original version of the establishment
clause as drafted by Madison,94 the changes made to Madison's
draft during the debates, 5 or the fact that Madison himself, while
serving as President, issued at least four religious proclamations.9 6
As for Jefferson, Justice Black failed to note that he, as President,
recommended and signed various treaties and extensions of acts
providing for the use of federal funds to construct and maintain
churches and to support religious activities and instructors.9 7 All of
these facts tend to show that Madison and Jefferson were not the
neutralists that Justice Black considered them to be.
Writing in favor of incorporation, Justice Black noted that the
establishment clause was to be interpreted quite broadly:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment
means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government
can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion,
aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can
force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from
church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief
in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or
professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or
non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be lev-
ied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever
they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or
practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government
can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious
organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson,
the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended
to erect "a wall of separation between church and State."'
Justice Black further commented that the wall erected by the es-
tablishment clause between church and state "must be kept high
and impregnable. We could not approve the slightest breach."99
Justice Black, in defining the meaning and scope of the estab-
lishment clause, paraphrased from the letter sent by President Jef-
ferson to the Danbury Connecticut Baptist Association on January
" See supra note 17 and accompanying text (Madison's original version of establish-
ment clause stated "nor shall any national religion be established").
" See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
" See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
9' See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
98 Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16 (citation omitted).
Id. at 18.
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1, 1802.100 However, Justice Black erred in taking one clause of Jef-
ferson's letter out of context and misinterpreting it, an error that
continues to plague the Supreme Court to this day.
From the letter, it is clear that Jefferson considered the estab-
lishment clause to be a restraint upon the federal government, not
the states.1"' Jefferson refers to the first amendment as "the act of
the whole American people" and as placing a restraint on "their
legislature" (i.e., Congress). 02 Thus, the "wall of separation" was
erected between church and the federal government, not between
church and the individual states. In Jefferson's mind, the authority
of the states over all religious matters was not affected by the first
amendment. Also, in light of Jefferson's activities as President, it
seems that Jefferson did not consider the wall to be
"impregnable.' 10 3
The Court's interpretation of the establishment clause in Ev-
erson is at odds with the historical underpinnings of that provi-
sion.104 The clause was designed to prevent preferential treatment
by the federal government of one religion over another, not prefer-
ential treatment of religion over irreligion.
B. McCollum v. Board of Education
In Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education'0 5 decided
approximately one year after Everson, the Court reaffirmed the in-
corporation of the establishment clause and its broad interpreta-
tion.106 McCollum was a "released time program" case.' The case
arose after various members of the Roman Catholic, Jewish, and
certain Protestant faiths organized the Champaign Council on Re-
ligious Education and obtained permission from the Champaign
100 See supra note 54 and accompanying text (text of letter).
,01 See 19 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 281-82 (A. Lipscomb & A. Bergh eds.
1905).
102 Id.
'0 See supra notes 54-71 and accompanying text.
oI It should be noted that the Court in Everson found that "tax-raised funds [could be
used] to pay the bus fares of parochial school pupils as a part of a general program under
which it pays the fares of pupils attending public and other schools." Everson, 330 U.S. at
17. The Court approved the plan because the state was "neutral in its relations with groups
of religious believers and non-6elievers." Id. at 18. However, this reasoning, insofar as it is
based on a neutrality of treatment of secular and sectarian interests, is historically and con-
stitutionally faulty.
10 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
,01 Id. at 211-12.
107 Id. at 205.
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Board of Education to offer religion classes in public school class-
rooms for students in the fourth through ninth grades."0 8 Only stu-
dents whose parents had signed request cards were allowed to at-
tend the religion classes; these students were released temporarily
from their regular classes. 10 9 The religion teachers, even though not
paid by the Champaign Board of Education, were subject to the
approval and supervision of the school superintendent.'"
The Champaign Board of Education urged the Court to recon-
sider the Everson interpretation of the establishment clause, argu-
ing that "historically the First Amendment was intended to forbid
only government preference of one religion over another, not an
impartial governmental assistance of all religions.""' The Board
also requested that the Court distinguish or overrule the holding in
Everson which incorporated the establishment clause into the
fourteenth amendment thereby making it applicable as a prohibi-
tion against the states." 2 Justice Black, who again authored the
Court's opinion, refused to comply with either request." 3
Justice Black quoted the Everson definition of the establish-
ment clause" 4 and invoked Jefferson's "wall of separation" lan-
guage. 1 5 Once again Justice Black asserted that the wall "must be
kept high and impregnable.""' 6
Justice Black's opinion in McCollum, inasmuch as it relied on
the Everson decision, is just as historically and constitutionally in-
accurate and unjustifiable. In addition, as in Everson, Justice
Black ignored relevant historical facts. It is obvious that he again
relied on Jefferson as support for an overly broad interpretation of
10. Id. at 207.
109 Id. at 207-08.
110 Id. at 208 (footnote omitted).
... Id. at 211.
112 Id.
"1 Id. at 212.
114 Id. at 210-11; see supra text accompanying note 98.
... McCollum, 333 U.S. at 211.
116 Id. at 212. In light of the facts of the case, Justice Black concluded:
This is beyond all question a utilization of the tax-established and tax-supported
public school system to aid religious groups to spread their faith. And it falls
squarely under the ban of the First Amendment (made applicable to the States by
the Fourteenth) as we interpreted in Everson v. Board of Education ....
Id. at 210. Justice Black further reasoned that not only were "the State's tax-supported
public school buildings used for the dissemination of religious doctrines," but the state also
afforded sectarian groups an invaluable aid in helping to provide "pupils for their religious
classes through use of the State's compulsory public school machinery." Id. at 212. Accord-
ing to Justice Black: "[tihis is not separation of Church and State." Id.
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the establishment clause. Ironically, as evident from Jefferson's ac-
tivities as rector to the University of Virginia, Jefferson in all like-
lihood would have approved, at least in theory, of the program at
issue in McCollum.117
1'. See 19 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 101, at 413-16. Jefferson, as
rector to the University of Virginia, a public institution, stated his views on a similar issue,
and it seems he would have approved of the McCollum program:
In the same report of the commissioners of 1818 it was stated by them that "in
conformity with the principles of constitution, which place all sects of religion on
an equal footing, with the jealousies of the different sects in guarding that equality
from encroachment or surprise, and with the sentiments of the legislature in free-
dom of religion, manifested on former occasions, they had not proposed that any
professorship of divinity should be established in the University; that provision,
however, was made for giving instruction in the Hebrew, Greek and Latin lan-
guages, the depositories of the originals, and of the earliest and most respected
authorities of the faith of every sect, and for courses of ethical lectures, developing
those moral obligations in which all sects agree. That, proceeding thus far, without
offence to the constitution, they had left, at this point, to every sect to take into
their own hands the office of further instruction in the peculiar tenet of each."
It was not, however, to be understood that instruction in religious opinion
and duties was meant to be precluded by the public authorities, as indifferent to
the interests of society. On the contrary, the relations which exist between man
and his Maker, and the duties resulting from those relations, are the most inter-
esting and important to every human being, and the most incumbent on his study
and investigation. The want of instruction in the various creeds of religious faith
existing among our citizens presents, therefore, a chasm in a general institution of
the useful sciences. But it was thought that this want, and the entrustment to
each society of instruction in its own doctrine, were evils of less danger than a
permission to the public authorities to dictate modes or principles of religious in-
struction, or than opportunities furnished them by giving countenance or ascen-
dancy to any one sect over another. A remedy, however, has been suggested of
promising aspect, which, while it excludes the public authorities from the domain
of religious freedom, will give to the sectarian schools of divinity the full benefit
the public provisions made for instruction in the other branches of science. These
branches are equally necessary to the divine as to the other professional or civil
characters, to enable them to fulfill the duties of their calling with understanding
and usefulness. It has, therefore, been in contemplation, and suggested by some
pious individuals, who perceive the advantages of associating other studies with
those of religion, to establish their religious schools on the confines of the Uni-
versity, so as to give to their students ready and convenient access and attend-
ance on the scientific lectures of the University; and to maintain, by that means,
those destined for the religious professions on as high a standing of science, and
of personal weight and respectability, as may be obtained by others from the
benefits of the University. Such establishments would offer the further and
greater advantage of enabling the students of the University to attend religious
exercises with the professor of their particular sect, either in the rooms of the
building still to be erected, and destined to that purpose under impartial regula-
tions, as proposed in the same report of the commissioners, or in the lecturing
room of such professor. To such propositions the Visitors are disposed to lend a
willing ear, and would think it their duty to give every encouragement, by assuring
to those who might choose such a location for their schools, that the regulations of
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Furthermore, Jefferson, while promulgating various regula-
tions for the University of Virginia on October 4, 1824, stated:
Should the religious sects of this State, or any of them, ac-
cording to the invitation held out to them, establish within, or
adjacent to, the precincts of the University, schools for instruc-
tion in the religion of their sect, the students of the University
will be free, and expected to attend religious worship at the estab-
lishment of their respective sects, in the morning, and in time to
meet their school in the University at its stated hour.
The students of such religious school, if they attend any
school of the University, shall be considered as students of the
University, subject to the same regulations, and entitled to the
same rights and privileges. 21
Jefferson stressed that public schools were to be independent
entities from the schools of religion held on their campuses."
Thus, Jefferson probably would have disapproved of the fact that
religious instructors were subject to the approval and supervision
of the superintendent of the Champaign public school system. This
fact, however, apparently was not the reason why the McCollum
Court struck down the program. The program was held to be un-
constitutional mainly because religion classes were being held in
public schools and because the program was administered through
the compulsory school system. 20 To Justice Black, this was an at-
tempt to scale the wall of separation between church and state,
and as such was a violation of the establishment clause.' 2 ' Jeffer-
son, however, on whose metaphor the Court so emphatically relied,
the University should be so modified and accommodated as to give every facility
of access and attendance to their students, with such regulated use also as may be
permitted to the other students, of the library which may hereafter be acquired,
either by public or private munificence. But always understanding that these
schools shall be independent of the University and of each other. Such an ar-
rangement would complete the circle of the useful sciences embraced by this insti-
tution, and would fill the chasm now existing, on principles which would leave
inviolate the constitutional freedom of religion, the most inalienable and sacred of
all human rights, over which the people and authorities of this state, individually
and publicly, have ever manifested the most watchful jealousy: and could this jeal-
ousy be now alarmed, in the opinion of the legislature, by what is here suggested,
the idea will be relinquished on any surmise of disapprobation which they might
think proper to express.
Id. (emphasis added).
18 Id. at 449.
See id. at 413-16.
12 See McCollum, 333 U.S. at 212.
.21 See id. at 210-12.
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would not, as evidenced by his writings, consider religion classes
held in public schools or compulsory attendance of such classes to
be an establishment clause violation; rather, Jefferson encouraged
such activity. '22
C. The Irony of Incorporation
In Everson, the Court engaged in a "selective historical analy-
sis" in order to support the incorporation of the establishment
clause and its overly broad interpretation.123 Justice Black incorpo-
rated the establishment clause without even referring to the de-
bates in the First House of Representatives, or to the fact that the
religion clauses were a federalism compromise designed to protect
the rights of the states to legislate regarding matters of religious
import.12 4 Applying the establishment clause applies to the states
produced an ironic result: an amendment supported by the states
as a means to protect their sovereignty was applied to the states as
a means to limit their power.125
The irony is carried one step further if the establishment
clause is interpreted as mandating neutralism. If one interprets the
establishment clause as barring all governmental religious assis-
tance-both preferential and nonpreferential-states are not only
limited in their efforts to support religion, they are precluded from
doing so. Such an interpretation turns the establishment clause on
its head; it has gone from a protector of state sovereignty to a pro-
hibition on state action.
Even the generation which adopted the fourteenth amend-
ment did not believe that the establishment clause prohibited state
aid of religion:' 26 a specific amendment was felt to be necessary to
accomplish that purpose. Accordingly, the Blaine amendment was
proposed.'27 While the amendment was passed by the House, it
122 See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
121 See supra notes 81-104 and accompanying text. One commentator has stated that
"the choice offered in contemporary church-state jurisprudence is between the intentions of
the framers and those of the temporary incumbents on the Supreme Court." Dunsford,
supra note 29, at 9.
124 G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1476 n.2 (11th ed. 1985) (citing HOWE, RELIGION
AND THE FREE SocIETY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION (1960))
125 See R. CORD, supra note 17, at 4-15.
12I See id. at 14.
127 The proposed amendment read as follows:
No State shall make any law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; and no money raised by taxation in any State for the
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narrowly missed receiving the necessary two-thirds vote in the
Senate. The fact that the Blaine amendment failed, even by the
slightest of margins, as well as the fact that it was introduced in
the first place, is evidence that the drafters of the fourteenth
amendment did not believe that the establishment clause should
apply to the states.
VI. MODERN SUPREME COURT APPROACH IN ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE CASES
A. The Lemon Test
While the Everson and McCollum decisions have been refined
somewhat, their neutralism rationales continue to haunt the Court.
In McGowan v. Maryland, 12  decided thirteen years after McCol-
lum, the Court set forth the first portion of the three-pronged test
currently used to decide establishment clause cases; for state ac-
tion arguably having religious import to be upheld, it must have a
secular purpose.1 29
Two years after McGowan, the Court decided School District
v. Schempp.130 After quoting prior cases advocating the broad in-
terpretation of the establishment clause, thereby suggesting the
continued vitality of Everson and McCollum, the Court reiterated
the McGowan prong of the test and added a second element: "to
support of public schools or derived from any public fund therefor, [sic] nor any
public lands devoted thereto, shall ever be under the control of any religious sect
or denomination; nor shall any money so raised or lands so devoted be divided
between religious sect or denominations;
Blaine Amendment, 4 CONG. REc. 5580 (1876). The amendment passed the House by a vote
of 180 to seven, but failed to get the requisite two-thirds vote in the Senate. See R. MORGAN,
THE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION 51 (1972).
128 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
19 Id. at 449-50. Although the Court in McGowan held that Sunday closing laws ac-
complished a secular purpose, the Court once again expressed an overly broad interpretation
of the establishment clause:
But, the First Amendment, in its final form, did not simply bar a congressional
enactment establishing a church; it forbade all laws respecting an establishment
of religion. Thus, this Court has given the Amendment a "broad interpretation in
the light of its history and the evils it was designed forever to suppress It has
found that the First and Fourteenth Amendments afford protection against reli-
gious establishment far more extensive than merely to forbid a national or state
church.
Id. at 441-42 (emphasis in original). The Court in McCollum also paid homage to the infa-
mous "wall of separation" passage from Everson. Id. at 442-43.
10 374 U.S. 203 (1963). Schempp held that prayer and Bible readings in public schools
violated the establishment clause. See id. at 223-26.
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withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be
a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither ad-
vances nor inhibits religion." '' The third prong of the test cur-
rently employed in establishment clause cases was set forth in
Walz v. Tax Commission.'32 The Walz Court noted that the end
result must not be "an excessive government entanglement with
religion."' 33
In Lemon v. Kurtzman,3 4 the Court delineated what has come
to be known as the "Lemon test" by incorporating the elements of
previous decisions regarding the establishment clause:
Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of
the cumulative criteria developed by the Court over many years.
Three such tests may be gleaned from our cases. First, the statute
must have a secular legislative purpose [the "purpose" prong];
second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither
advances not inhibits religion [the "effects" prong]... ; finally,
the statute must not foster "an excessive government entangle-
ment with religion [the "entanglement" prong]. 135
Although the Court in Lemon recognized that complete sepa-
ration of church and state is not possible and that "[s]ome rela-
Id. at 222 (emphasis added) (citing Everson and McGowan).
132 397 U.S. 664 (1970). The Court in Walz held that property tax exemptions granted
to religious organizations for property used exclusively for religious purposes did not violate
the establishment clause. Id. at 672-80.
133 Id. at 674.
1.4 403 U.S. 602 (1971). In Lemon, the Court found that Rhode Island and Pennsylva-
nia statutes which provided for the payment of salary supplements to teachers in nonpublic
schools and for the reimbursement of nonpublic schools for various "secular" textbooks and
instructional materials violated the establishment clause because the statutes resulted in
excessive entanglement between government and religion. See id. at 619-20. The Court so
held even though the statutes prohibited teachers who received such supplements from
teaching religion courses, and proscribed the use of such textbooks and materials in religion
classes. See id. at 608, 610.
135 Id. at 612-13 (citation omitted). The Lemon test, although refined by Justice
O'Connor's endorsement analysis in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring), is the current test of choice for a majority of the Supreme Court members in
establishment clause cases. See infra notes 164-69, 186-216 and accompanying text.
The one exception in which the Court has not applied Lemon to determine an estab-
lishment clause case is Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). See Edwards v. Aguillard,
482 U.S. 578, 583 n.4, 107 S. Ct. 2573, 2577 n.4 (1987). In Marsh, the Court in a 6-to-3
decision found that the Nebraska legislature's practice of opening the legislative session
with a prayer led by a chaplain paid by the state did not violate the establishment clause.
The Court based its decision on historical considerations; namely, that the First Congress
instituted the chaplain system, and, therefore, intended the establishment clause to author-
ize the practice. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 787-92.
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tionship between government and religious organizations is inevi-
table,"'36 the Court did not repudiate the Everson and McCollum
call for neutralism. In fact, the influence of those decisions is evi-
dent in the Lemon test, particularly in the first two prongs. In stat-
ing that a "statute must have a secular legislative purpose" and
that "its principal or primary effect must be one that neither ad-
vances nor inhibits religion,' 13 7 the Lemon Court implicitly ac-
knowledged Justice Black's statement in Everson that "[n]either
[a state nor the federal government] can pass laws which aid one
religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another."'38
Thus, the flawed historical rationale propounded by the Court in
Everson and McCollum is alive in the current establishment clause
test.
In addition to being flawed from a complete historical perspec-
tive, the Lemon test, from a practical standpoint, is nearly impos-
sible to apply with any measure of consistency and thus lends itself
to "judgments based on the Court's perceived notions of public
policy and the exigencies of the moment."'3 9 For example, the re-
sults of the Court's decisions are that:
-the government may not supplement parochial school teach-
ers' salaries, " 0 but it may employ and pay with public tax money
chaplains in legislative bodies, the armed services, and in public
prisons and hospitals, and it may pay for veterans' sectarian train-
ing for the ministry;' 4 '
-the states may not allow noncompulsory prayer, Bible read-
ing, or meditation in the public schools, 42 but it is permissible to
have opening prayers in Congress and the Supreme Court, as well
as "In God We Trust" on our currency, and "Under God" in the
Pledge of Allegiance and the National Anthem;14
-high schools may not allow religious groups to use school
property even after school hours,14 4 but colleges may not refuse to
1"I Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614 (citations omitted).
137 Id. at 612.
138 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
139 See Cornelius, supra note 31, at 8-9 (footnote omitted).
10 Id. at 6 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 607, 607(1971)).
141 Id. (citing Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983); McCollum v. Board of
Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 253-54 (1948) (Reed, J., dissenting).
142 Id. (citing School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421, 436 (1962)).
113 Id. at 6-7 (citing School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 299-304 (1963)).
144 Id. at 7 (citing, inter alia, McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948)).
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do so; 115
-states may furnish bus transportation to parochial school
children, 4  but may not pay the expenses of their field trips for
instructional purposes;"
-the state may loan textbooks to parochial schools'48 but not
other teaching and testing materials; 4 9
-a state may exempt church property and schools from taxa-
tion,1 0 but may not reimburse church schools for expenses of tests
and examinations;' 5'
-a state may not give financial aid to repair a church sup-
ported secondary school, 152 but may build academic buildings for
sectarian colleges'5 3 and lease state land to a church school for the
purposes of working a tax exemption; 54
-a state may compel a business to close on Sunday'55. . . but
may not allow schools to display the Ten Commandments in their
hallways; 5 6
-public schools may not allow released time for religious ser-
vices on school property, 57 but may do so for services held off the
premises; 58
-states may not give tax relief only for tuition paid to paro-
chial schools,' 59 but may allow tax deductions for such tuition if
the program also allows a similar deduction for public school
41 Id. (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267-69 (1981)).
16 Id. (citing Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17 (1947)).
147 Id. (citing Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 254 (1977)).
148 Id. (citing Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 362 (1975); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392
U.S. 236, 245-48 (1968); Cochran v. Louisiana State Board of Educ., 281 U.S. 370, 375
(1930)).
119 Id. (citing Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 372-73 (1975)).
110 Id. (citing Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
812 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Walz v. Tax Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970)).
151 Id. (citing Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472, 480
(1973)).
112 Id. (citing Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
774-75 (1973)).
153 Id. (citing Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 678-80 (1971)).
151 Id. (citing Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 749 (1973)).
"I" Id. (citing McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961)).
16 Id. at 8 (citing Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980)).
107 Id. (citing McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 210 (1948)).
58 Id. (citing Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952)).
159 Id. (citing Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 832 (1973); Committee for Pub. Educ. v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 783-86 (1973)).
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expenses; 60
-and the state may provide therapeutic and diagnostic health
services to a church school in a mobile unit parked next to the
school,16  but not in the school itself.162
Unfortunately, in its most recent opinions on the subject, the Su-
preme Court has shown an unwillingness to retreat from Lemon
or its unsupportable underpinnings.6 3
B. Recent Pre-1989 Supreme Court Decisions
Before its latest pronouncements on the issue,6 the Court
faced establishment clause issues in a number of different con-
texts.' In five of those cases, a clear majority of the Justices ap-
plied the Lemon rationale to strike down the state statutes chal-
lenged on establishment clause principles. 66 Lemon also was
160 Id. (citing Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394-96 (1983)).
161 Id. (citing Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 248 (1977)).
162 Id. (citing Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 368-69 (1975)); see also Choper, The
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. PITT. L. REv. 673,
680-81 (1980) (Court decisions reflect doctrinal inconsistency concerning governmental
assistance).
163 See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989) (display of creche in
county courthouse held violative of establishment clause).
164 The Supreme Court faced establishment clause issues during its 1989 term in
County of Allegheny v. A.C.L.U., 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989), and Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock,
109 S. Ct. 890 (1989). The Court addressed the establishment clause during this term in
Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 110 S. Ct. 688 (1990).
16I See, e.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988); Church of Jesus Christ of the
Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987);
Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986); School Dist. v.
Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); Estate of Thornton v.
Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
166 Edwards, 482 U.S. at 585-610. Seven members of the Court, applied Lemon, al-
though Justice White did so somewhat reluctantly, and struck down a Louisiana statute
requiring the teaching in public schools of creation science if evolution was being taught. Id.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, Stevens, and O'Connor,
found that the statute violated the "purpose" prong, which is to determine "'whether gov-
ernment's actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion.'" Id. at 585 (quoting Jus-
tice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. at 668, 690 (1984)). Even
with Justice Powell now gone, this signals an express adoption by a majority of the Court of
Justice O'Connor's endorsement test. See infra notes 184-202 and accompanying text. Jus-
tice White rejected the majority's reasoning, but concurred on the ground that "'the district
courts and courts of appeals are better schooled and more able to interpret the [purpose of]
laws of their respective states.'" Edwards, 482 U.S. at 609 (White, J. concurring) (quoting
Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 500 (1985). Justice Scalia, joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist in dissent, expressed a desire to abandon the Lemon "purpose" prong, on
which the majority relied to invalidate the statute. See id. at 612-19 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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applied in three cases where the statute in issue was upheld
against an establishment clause challenge.167 Most of the opinions
In School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985), six members of the Court applied the Lemon
test and struck down two municipal programs, one which provided classes in nonpublic
school classrooms to nonpublic school students at public expense and one which provided
community education programs taught by public school employees in facilities leased from
nonpublic schools. Id. at 385-400. Two members of the Court applied Lemon and found that
the latter program violated the establishment clause while the former did not. Each of the
eight justices either expressly or implicitly applied the endorsement test to analyze the pro-
grams under the "effects" prong. Id. at 385-400. Justice Rehnquist dissented on the ground
that the Court's reasoning was based on the "faulty 'wall' premise." Id. at 401. (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
In Aguilar, five members of the Court applied the Lemon test and struck down, on the
ground of excessive entanglement, the use by New York City of federal funds to finance
programs that sent public school teachers and other professionals into religious and other
nonpublic schools to provide remedial instruction and clinical and guidance services. 473
U.S. at 410-19. In her dissent, joined by Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor "question[ed]
the utility of entanglement as a separate Establishment Clause standard in most cases." Id.
at 422 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In Estate of Thornton, eight members of the Court ap-
plied the Lemon test and struck down a Connecticut statute providing employees with the
absolute right not to work on their chosen Sabbath. 472 U.S. at 711. Six of the Justices
struck down the law as violative of the "effects" prong without mentioning endorsement. Id.
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Marshall, filed a concurring opinion, stating that "the
Connecticut Sabbath law has an impermissible effect because it conveys a message of en-
dorsement of the Sabbath observance." Id. at 711 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Rehn-
quist dissented without opinion. In Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985), six members of
the Court, after applying the Lemon test, struck down an Alabama statute authorizing a
period of silence for "meditation or voluntary prayer." Id. at 61. In finding that the statute
violated the "purpose" prong, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Blackmun, applied O'Connor's endorsement test, stating that "[i]n applying the purpose
test, it is appropriate to ask 'whether government's actual purpose is to endorse or disap-
prove of religion.'" Id. at 56 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. at 680 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)). Justice Powell implicitly, and Justice O'Connor expressly, in their concurring
opinions, also advocated use of the endorsement analysis. Id. at 62-63 (Powell, J., concur-
ring), 69-70 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
"167 See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988). Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for
the Court and joined by Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, Justice O'Connor
in her concurrrence, and Justice Kennedy, whom Justice Scalia joined, in his concurrence,
all looked to the Lemon rationale to uphold a federal statute authorizing federal grants to
public or nonpublic (including religous) organizations for the provision of family counseling
services Id. All four dissenting Justices also applied Lemon, agreeing with the majority's
analysis under the "purpose" prong, but referring to Justice O'Connor's endorsement test in
finding the challenged activity violative of the "effects" prong. Id. In Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987), Justice White, who authored the major-
ity opinion, and the concurring Justices, in the face of a request not to apply Lemon on the
ground that it is unsuited for judging the constitutionality of exemption statutes, utilized
Lemon to uphold the exemption of religous organizations with respect to their secular non-
profit activities from the Civil Rights Act's prohibition against religous discrimination in
employment. Id. Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Blackmun, filed a concurring opinion
which analyzed the exemption under the "effects" prong by use of the endorsement test,
and stated that "endorsement" was the proper manner in which to analyze the "inquiry
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in those cases failed even to mention, let alone analyze, the histori-
cal basis underlying the establishment clause. 68 In keeping with
the historical and constitutional flaw that permeates Lemon, the
majority of Justices continued to assert that the establishment
clause not only prohibits preferential treatment of one religion
over others, but also mandates neutralism.'69
framed by Lemon." 483 U.S. at 346-49 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
In Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986), Justice
Marshall, who wrote the majority opinion, and the four concurring Justices applied Lemon
and upheld the extension of aid under the Washington vocational rehabilitation assistance
program to a blind person who was studying at a Christian college and seeking to become a
pastor, missionary, or youth director. Id. Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan,
Blackmun, and Stevens, referred to Justice O'Connor's endorsement test in analyzing (and
upholding) the program under the first two Lemon prongs. Id. at _. Justice White con-
curred without mentioning Lemon or endorsement, stating "that the Court's decisions find-
ing constitutional violations where a State provides aid to private schools or their students
misconstrue the Establishment Clause and disserve the public interest." Id. at 490 (White,
J., concurring). Justice O'Connor concurred in the use of her test in a separate opinion. Id.
at 493 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Rehnquist, did not mention the endorsement test in his analysis of the "effects" prong. Id.
at 490-92 (Powell, J., concurring).
188 In Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987), Justice Brennan, joined by Justices
Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens stated that "a historical approach is not useful in
determining the proper roles of church and state in public schools, since free public educa-
tion was virtually nonexistent at the time the Constitution was adopted." Id. at 583 n.4. In
his concurring opinion, however, Justice Powell, joined by Justice O'Connor, engaged in a
brief historical examination surrounding the establishment clause. The examination was not
extensive, focused on the issue of religious tolerance, and made no mention of the federalism
compromise that resulted in the establishment clause. Id. at 597-608. A passing historical
reference was made by Justice White in his opinion for the Court in Amos and by Justice
Brennan in his concurrence. Justice White observed that "'for the men who wrote the Reli-
gion Clauses of the First Amendment the 'establishment' of a religion connoted sponsorship,
financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity,'" 483 U.S. at
337 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)), an overly broad intimation of
the drafter's intent. In a footnote, Brennan quoted from Madison's Memorial and Remon-
strance to the effect that religion must be left to the conviction and conscience of every
individual to exercise as he or she sees fit. 483 U.S. at 341 n.2. And Justice Brennan, writing
for the majority in School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball, made the bald statement, with-
out any historical examination, that the framers of the establishment clause intended the
government to maintain a course of neutrality among religions and between religion and
irreligion. Ball, 473 U.S. at 382. This simply is at odds with historical reality.
19 E.g., Ball, 476 U.S. at 389; Wallace v. Jafree, 472 U.S. 38, 52-53 (1985). In keeping
with the many inconsistencies that plague this area of the law, Chief Justice Rehnquist
wrote, in Bowen v. Kendrick, that "[iun our view, this reflects the statute's successful main-
tenance of a 'course of neutrality among religion and between religion and non-religion,'"
Bowen, 487 U.S. at 389 (citation omitted). Justice Rehnquist stated after a fairly detailed
historical examination in Wallace that "[t]he Establishment Clause did not require govern-
ment neutrality between religion and irreligion nor did it prohibit the Federal Government
from providing nondiscriminatory aid to religion." Wallace, 472 U.S. at 106 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). Furthermore, Justice Stevens, who authored the opinion of the Court in Wal-
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Only Chief Justice Rehnquist has engaged in anything close to
a thorough historical analysis into the true meaning of the estab-
lishment clause. 170 Then-Associate Justice Rehnquist reviewed the
history surrounding the drafting and ratification of the establish-
ment clause, as well as post-enactment historical factors. 1' He
concluded, based upon his historical examination, that the estab-
lishment clause was intended to do no more than prohibit
preferentialism.1 2
lace and joined in the Court's opinion in Ball, also joined in the Court's opinion in Amos, in
which it is stated that the Court "has never indicated that statutes that give special consid-
eration to religious groups are per se invalid. That would run contrary to the teaching of our
cases that there is ample room for accommodation of religion under the Establishment
Clause." Amos, 483 U.S. at 338.
170 Wallace, 472 U.S. at 91-114 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In Lynch, then Chief Justice
Burger engaged in a limited historical analysis, citing numerous examples in which the gov-
ernment has engaged in activity having religious significance. 465 U.S. at 673-78. Justice
Burger, however, failed, inter alia, to consider the history surrounding the drafting of the
establishment clause. Justice White also has indicated his appreciation of an examination
into the historical foundation of the establishment clause: "I appreciate Justice Rehnquist's
explication of the history of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. Against that
history, it would be quite understandable if we undertook to reassess our cases dealing with
these Clauses, particularly those dealing with the Establishment Clause." Wallace, 472 U.S.
at 91 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White, however, never engaged in a detailed historical
examination of the establishment clause.
171 See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 92-106 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
171 See id. at 106-07 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Rehnquist stated:
It would seem from this evidence that the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment had acquired a well-accepted meaning: it forbade establishment of a
national religion, and forbade preference among religious sects or denominations..
. The Establishment Clause did not require government neutrality between reli-
gion and irreligion nor did it prohibit the Federal Government from providing
non-discriminatory aid to religion. There is simply no historical foundation for the
proposition that the Framers intended to build the "wall of separation" that was
constitutionalized in Everson.
But the greatest injury of the "wall" notion is its mischievous diversion of
judges from the actual intentions of the drafters of the Bill of Rights. The "cruci-
ble of litigation,".., is well adapted to adjudicating factual disputes on the basis
of testimony presented in court, but no amount of repetition of historical errors in
judicial opinions can make the errors true. The "wall of separation between
church and State" is a metaphor based on bad history, a metaphor which has
proved useless as a guide to judging. It should be frankly and explicitly
abandoned.
Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citations and footnote omitted). Rehnquist further stated:
The Framers intended the Establishment Clause to prohibit the designation
of any church as a "national" one. The Clause was also designed to stop the Fed-
eral Government from asserting a preference for one religious denomination or
sect over others. Given the "incorporation" of the Establishment Clause as against
the States via the Fourteenth Amendment in Everson, States are prohibited as
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Justice Rehnquist also noted that the Lemon test, which is but
an effort to apply the "wall of separation" metaphor, is equally
devoid of a historical foundation:
[T]he Lemon test has no more grounding in the history of
the First Amendment than does the wall theory upon which it
rests. The three-part test represents a determined effort to craft a
workable rule from a historically faulty doctrine; but the rule can
only be as sound as the doctrine it attempts to service.17
In the concluding remarks of his Wallace v. Jaffree dissent,
Justice Rehnquist provided food for the thought of abandoning the
Lemon test in favor of an analysis rooted in the intended meaning
of the establishment clause:
The Court strikes down the Alabama statute [in Wallace v. Jaf-
free] because the State wished to "characterize prayer as a fa-
vored practice." It would come as much of a shock to those who
drafted the Bill of Rights as it will to a large number of thought-
ful Americans today to learn that the Constitution, as construed
by the majority, prohibits the Alabama Legislature from "endors-
ing" prayer. George Washington himself, at the request of the
very Congress which passed the Bill of Rights, proclaimed a day
of "public thanksgiving and prayer, to be observed by acknowl-
edging with grateful hearts the many and signal favors of Al-
mighty God." History must judge whether it was the Father of
his Country in 1789, or a majority of the Court today, which has
strayed from the meaning of the Establishment Clause.174
well from establishing a religion or discriminating between sects. As its history
abundantly shows, however, nothing in the Establishment Clause requires govern-
ment to be strictly neutral between religion and irreligion, nor does that Clause
prohibit Congress or the States from pursuing legitimate secular ends through
nondiscriminatory sectarian means.
Id. at 113.
1.. Id. at 110 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
171 Id. at 113 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). It is inter-
esting to note that Justice Rehnquist joined in the concurring opinion of Justice Powell in
Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 490-92 (1988). In his
concurrence, Justice Powell agreed that the central question was whether the Washington
provision had the "principal or primary effect" of advancing religion under Lemon. Id. at
490. Witters, though, is not determinative of Justice Rehnquist's thinking on establishment
clause issues, as it was a case in which the Court could apply Lemon and uphold the validity
of the challenged statute. Moreover, in his first opinion for the Court on the issue after
being named Chief Justice, Justice Rehnquist, in Bowen v. Kendrick, applied the Lemon
test to uphold a federal statute against an establishment clause challenge. Nowhere in the
opinion did Justice Rehnquist explore the history surrounding the drafting or ratification of
the clause in an effort to explicate the true purpose and meaning of the provision. Subse-
quent cases, however, suggest that the Chief Justice analyzed the statute under Lemon be-
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C. County of Allegheny v. ACLU-The Case of Dual Symbols
At issue in County of Allegheny v. ACL L 75 was whether the
placement of a crgche within the Allegheny County courthouse,
and the display of a menorah on the steps of the adjoining city-
county government building jointly owned and operated by the
County of Allegheny and City of Pittsburgh, violated the establish-
ment clause. Once again, the doctrinal havoc of Lemon reared its
sour head.
1. Lower court decisions
The district court, which indicated that the Supreme Court's
opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly'76 was controlling, concluded that
the display of the creche and menorah did not violate constitu-
tional principles.177 A divided panel of the Third Circuit reversed
and found the displays violative of the establishment clause.' 78
The facts with respect to the displays were significant to the
Third Circuit's analysis. The court described the displays as
follows:
Annually since 1981 the county has permitted the display of a
creche enclosed by a fence on the grand staircase of the first floor
of the county courthouse. The creche consists of traditional
cause there was enough votes to uphold the statute under that analysis. For instance, Jus-
tice Rehnquist joined in the dissent of Justice Scalia in Edwards v. Aguilard, in which
Justice Scalia noted "the pessimestic evaluation that The Chief Justice made of the totality
of Lemon," and called for the abandonment of Lemon's "purpose" prong. Id. at 2605. More-
over, Justice Rehnquist recently joined in the opinion of Justice Kennedy in County of Alle-
gheny v. ACLU, 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3134-146 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissent-
ing in part). In his opinion, Justice Kennedy stated that the displays at issue were
constitutional even under Lemon, but strongly hinted that he was willing to scrap the test
as the guide in establishment clause cases; Justice Kennedy also noted various historical
examples of the role of religion in our society. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissent-
ing in part); see infra note 223 and accompanying text.
.75 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989).
176 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
7 See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 842 F.2d 655, 658 (3d Cir. 1988), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989). In an oral opinion, the district court stated:
Certainly the local governments should not be enjoined from allowing both faiths
to call attention to the miracles which enrich their histories, either the virgin birth
or the burning of one day's oil for many days while the Jews sought to recapture
their temple, so long as the symbols are part of a holiday season display. I should
think the joint displays [send] a message that in Pittsburgh the faiths harmonize
and both seek to send some light to the world at the holiday seasons. I cannot
conceive that [a] court should forbid such a thing or declare it illegal.
Id.
178 Id. at 659-63.
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figures ranging in height from three to 15 inches, including a
wooden stable with the infant Jesus, the Virgin Mary, Joseph, the
Three Wise Men, shepherds, various animals and an angel hold-
ing a banner reading "Gloria in Excelsis Deo" ("Glory to God in
the Highest"), The creche, though stored in the basement of the
courthouse, is the property of the Holy Name Society of the Dio-
cese of Pittsburgh, a Catholic men's organization and thus a sign
in front of it recites: "This display donated by the Holy Name
Society." Though it is erected, arranged and disassembled each
year by the moderator of the Holy Name Society, the county sup-
plies a dolly and minimal aid to transport it to and from the
courthouse basement. While the county provides no special secur-
ity or illumination for the display, its Bureau of Cultural Pro-
grams decorates the creche with red and white poinsettia plants
and evergreen trees purchased at public expense. The county also
displays wreaths purchased through county funds. Other decora-
tions such as trees, Santa Clauses and additional wreaths are dis-
played by various departments and offices throughout the court-
house building.
The creche is displayed for about six weeks from late Novem-
ber to early January. During the weeks prior to Christmas the
county sponsors Christmas carol programs on the first floor of the
courthouse with the chorale groups using the creche for a fore-
ground. The choirs, typically high school students, sing popular
songs and religious and secular Christmas carols. The caroling is
broadcast by loudspeakers to the public in the courthouse. The
programs are dedicated to the universal themes of world peace
and brotherhood and to the memory of persons missing in action
in the Vietnam War. The grand staircase and the surrounding
area are used throughout the year for art displays and other civic
and cultural events and programs.
The courthouse houses the principal offices of the county, in-
cluding those of its governing officers, the county commissioners,
and the treasurer and controller, as well as the criminal and some
civil courts of Allegheny County. In view of the cr~che's location,
it is probably seen by many visitors to the courthouse including
taxpayers, lawyers trying cases or serving as arbitrators, litigants,
persons desiring to search certain court records and people with
business at the sheriff's office.
The City-County Building, the site of the menorah, is one
block from the courthouse. The various public offices in the build-
ing include those of the city treasurer, county prothonotary, mar-
riage license bureau and the register of wills. In addition, certain
courts sit in the building. Although the building bears the name
of both political subdivisions, the menorah is placed in an area
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maintained solely by the city. For a number of years during the
Christmas season the city has installed a 45 foot Christmas tree
on a platform on the front steps of the main entrance of the
building and next to the tree on the steps of the main entrance to
the building since 1982 the city has annually erected an appoxi-
mately 18 foot high menorah. The menorah, which was purchased
by Chabad [a Jewish organization], is put in place at the time of
the Jewish celebration of Chanukah.""
The Third Circuit agreed with the district court "that the
starting point of [the] analysis should be Lynch v. Donnelly,"'180
and noted:
[T]he second prong of the Lemon test is that most readily vio-
lated as a public entity usually is able to articulate some secular
purpose for a display (first prong) and the mere placement and
storage of a display will involve little entanglement (third prong)
of government and religion .... On the other hand the use of a
religous symbol in a display on public property or by a public
entity may well be deemed an endorsement of religion regardless
of an entity's stated reasons for its placement and thereby impli-
cate the second Lemon prong as the impact of the display must
be judged objectively. The variables that a court should consider
in determining whether a display has the effect of advancing or
endorsing religion include: (1) the location of the display; (2)
whether the display is part of a larger configuration including
nonreligious items; (3) the religious intensity of the display; (4)
whether the display.is shown in connection with a general secular
holiday; (5) the degree of public participation in the ownership
and maintenance of the display; and (6) the existance of disclaim-
ers of public sponsorship of the display.181
Applying the facts before it to the variables it said should be con-
sidered for the purpose of determining whether the effects prong of
Lemon has been crossed, the Third Circuit ruled:
Each display was located at or in a public building devoted to
core functions of government and each was placed at a prominent
site at the public building where visitors would see it. Further,
while the menorah was placed near a Christmas tree, neither the
creche nor the menorah can reasonably be deemed to have been
subsumed by a larger display of non-religious items. In addition,
179 Id. at 657.
"0 Id. at 659.
181 Id. at 661-62 (citation omitted).
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both the creche and the menorah are associated with religious
holidays and would be viewed as pertaining to a particular reli-
gion. Further, the menorah, unlike the creche, is not associated
with a holiday with secular aspects. There is public participation,
albeit minimal, in both the storage and placement of the displays.
Overall, when the record is evaluated in light of these considera-
tions, the only reasonable conclusion is that by permitting the
creche and the menorah to be placed at the buildings the city and
county have tacitly endorsed Christianity and Judaism and have
therefore acted to advance religion. While we do not doubt that
some persons find this laudable, it is impermissible under the sec-
ond prong of the Lemon test and thus violates the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment.
We recognize, of course, that there is a sign near the creche
indicating that the display is a donation of the Holy Name Soci-
ety. That factor, however, cannot possibly outweigh the consider-
ations which lead us to find that placement of the creche violated
the second prong of the Lemon test.182
182 Allegheny, 842 F.2d at 662 (footnote omitted). The court also explained that "we do
not imply that if only a crbche or only a menorah had been involved our result would have
been different. Quite to the contrary we would have reached the same result if only one of
the displays had been placed by defendants or either of them." Id. at 662 n.1.
A strong dissent was voiced to the Third Circuit's opinion in Allegheny. After labeling
the position adopted by the other two members of the panel as "aggressive 'neutrality'."
Judge Weis stated that such an approach is "contrary to the spirit of religous liberty em-
bodied in the First Amendment and will lead not to accommodation but to anomosity, not
to tolerance of, but hostility toward, religion." Id. at 663 (Weis, J., dissenting). Judge Weis
then considered many of the same historical points raised in this article, id. at 663-65 (Weis,
J., dissenting), and concluded that "the historical evidence is clear that the Framers did not
intend the Establishment Clause to erect between religion and state a 'wall of separation.'"
Id. at 665 (Weis, J., dissenting).
Judge Weis then took issue with the court's analysis in Lynch v. Donnelly:
[Tihe court of appeals' preoccupation with the Christmas display location in
City Hall is especially perplexing in light of the Supreme Court's decision in
Marsh v. Chambers. In that case, the challenged prayer service was conducted in
the legislative chamber itself - not a public area of the capitol building. If the
Supreme Court did not consider that practice a prohibited endorsement of the
sectarian beliefs espoused by the legislatively-paid chaplain, it is difficult to un-
derstand why a creche displayed in a government building during the Christmas
season cannot pass constitutional muster. ...
Equally unpersuasive is the . . . adorned/unadorned distinction. Lynch sim-
ply does not support applying such a "Two Plastic Reindeer" rule. As Justice
O'Connor noted, the secular decorations surrounding the Pawtucket creche did
not nullify its sectarian religous significance. Rather, the Decemeber holiday set-
ting was the element that altered "what viewers may fairly understand to be the
purpose of the display - as a typical museum setting, though not neutralizing the
religous content of a religious painting, negates any message of endorsement of
that content." Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692, 104 S. Ct. at 1369 (O'Connor, J.,
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2. The Supreme Court Approaches in Allegheny
True to form, one needs a road map to determine the Supreme
Court's ruling in this establishment clause case. 18 3
concurring).
This "unadorned" distinction, even if valid, is irrelevant here. The Pittsburgh
creche was surrounded by traditional Christmas symbols, including wreaths, ever-
green trees, and poinsettia plants, and served as a thematic backdrop for the
County's traditional holiday choral program. The appellants' contention that
these obviously secular symbols are not secular enough calls to mind Judge Nel-
son's admonition: "I question whether it is appropriate for the federal courts to
tell the towns and villages of America how much paganism they need to put in
their Christmas decorations." City of Birmingham, 791 F.2d at 1569 (Nelson, J.,
dissenting).
The tone of Lynch is unmistakable. I have found no indication that the Paw-
tucket display survived constitutional scrutiny because it was situated in a private
park rather than a county courthouse, or because it closely resembled a miniature
golf course with candy-striped poles, talking wishing wells, and cut-out elephants.
The civil government's recognition of the origins of Christmas during the holiday
season simply was not perceived by the Supreme Court as a threat to the aims of
the Establishment Clause. The Court all but dismissed the appellant's claim as
much ado about nothing and, reading the opinion, one can imagine the Court
steadfastly resisting the temptation of chiding, "Bah humbug!"
...Viewed from the average citizen's perspective, the cr~che and the Christ-
mas tree in the Courthouse together with the menorah affixed to the front of the
City-County Building constitute but one large display commemorating the holiday
season.
Viewing these displays as a whole, I find that the "message" conveys no more
government endorsement of religion than if the cr6che alone were exhibited. In-
cluding a reference to Chanukah did no more than broaden the commemoration of
the holiday season and stress the notion of sharing in its joy. By marking the
Judeo-Christian aspects of the holiday season, the local governments appropri-
ately called attention to the great pluralism that is the hallmark of religous toler-
ence in this country.
Id. at 668-71 (Weis, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
183 The directions look like this:
BLACKMUN, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the
opinion of the Court with respect to Parts III-A, IV, and V, in which BRENNAN,
MARSHALL, STEVENS, and O'CONNOR, J.J., joined, an opinion with respect
to Parts I and II, in which O'CONNOR and STEVENS, J.J., joined, an opinion
with respect to Part III-B, in which STEVENS, J., joined, [an opinion with re-
spect to Part VII, in which O'CONNOR, J., joined,] and an opinion with respect
to Part VI. O'CONNOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment, in Part II of which BRENNAN and STEVENS, J.J., joined.
BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in
which MARSHALL and STEVENS, J.J., joined. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which BRENNAN and MARSHALL,
J.J., joined. KENNEDY, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part
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The bottom line is that six Justices found in favor of the constitu-
tionality of the menorah display, while only four voted in favor of
the creche; therefore the menorah stands but the creche falls.
a. The "Majority" Analysis
Justice Blackmun began his analysis by quoting at length the
infamous Everson passage,8 and concluded once again (along with
the other Justices who joined in the majority opinion) that the es-
tablishment clause demands neutralism. 18 5 In reaching this unsup-
portable but not surprising conclusion, the majority of Justices ex-
pressly rejected the concept of nonpreferentialism.' 86
and dissenting in part, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and WHITE and SCALIA,
J.J., joined.
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 109 S. Ct. 3086 3092-93 (1989).
184 Justice Blackmun wrote:
"The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at least
this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can
pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over an-
other. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or remain away from
church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.
No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbe-
liefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or
small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever
they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in
the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa."
Id. at 3100 (quoting Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947)). Blackmun stopped
his homage to Everson one sentence short of the famous "wall of separation" metaphor.
185 For instance, Justice Blackmun stated that "we have held [the establishment clause]
to mean no official preference even for religion over nonreligion." Id. at 3107 (citation omit-
ted); see also id. at 3119 ("government is to be neutral in matters of religion") (O'Connor,
J., concurring), at 3128 ("[w]e have .. .interpreted that Clause to require neutrality, not
just among religions, but between religion and nonreligion") (Brennan, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part), at 3130 (establishment clause "forbids even a partial establish-
ment, . . . not only of a particular sect in favor of others, but also of religion in preference to
nonreligion") (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
This same sentiment was expressed in Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 109 S. Ct. 890
(1989), an establishment clause case decided earlier in the term. In that case Justice Bren-
nan said: "In proscribing all laws 'respecting an establishment of religion', the Constitution
prohibits, at the very least, legislation that constitutes an endorsement of one or another set
of religious beliefs or of religion generally." Id. at 896. Not to be outdone, Justice Blackmun
noted "that government may not favor religious belief over disbelief." Id. at 906 (Blackmun,
J., concurring).
188 In tearing down the creche, Blackmun explained: "Even if the Grand Staircase
[where the creche was placed] occasionally was used for displays other than the creche . .. it
remains true that any display located there fairly may be understood to express views that
receive the support and endorsement of the government." Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3104
n.50. Justice Brennan joined: "I know of no principle under the Establishment Clause ...
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Justice Blackmun then invoked Lemon as the alpha of estab-
lishment clause analysis.187 In the next breath, he noted that re-
cent decisions have added a gloss to that analysis by looking to the
endorsement test, advocated by Justice O'Connor in Lynch, for
guidance in determining whether a violation of the first two Lemon
prongs has occurred.188 As Justice Blackmun explained:
Since Lynch, the Court has made clear that, when evaluating the
effect of government conduct under the Establishment Clause, we
must ascertain whether "the challenged governmental action is
sufficiently likely to be perceived by adherents of the controlling
denominations as an endorsement, and by the nonadherents as a
disapproval, of their individual religious choices." Accordingly,
our present task is to determine whether the display of the creche
and the menorah, in their respective "particular physical set-
tings," has the effect of endorsing or disapproving religious
beliefs. 88
Much like the Third Circuit opinion below, Justice Blackmun
turned to the "setting determinative analysis" required by the en-
dorsement inquiry. In so doing, Justice Blackmun perceived a re-
sult affecting differences between the creche displays in Allegheny
and Lynch:
Here, unlike in Lynch, nothing in the context of the display de-
tracts from the cr~che's religious message. The Lynch display
that permits us to conclude that governmental promotion of religion is acceptable so long as
one religion is not favored." Id. at 3128 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
11" Id. at 3100. Before beginning his analysis, Justice Blackmun in the majority opinion
also took a moment to selectively misinterpret history in an effort to justify his approach.
According to Justice Blackmun, "[p]recisely because of the religious diversity that is our
national heritage, the Founders added to the Constitution a Bill of Rights, the very first
words of which declare: 'Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.'" Id. at 3099. The establishment clause, however,
was intended to have little to do with religious diversity in the sense alluded to by Justice
Blackmun. Nowhere in his opinion does Justice Blackmun mention the federalism compro-
mise that was at the heart of the establishment clause: to protect the right of the states to
legislate free of federal intervention on matters of religion. See supra notes 16-33 and ac-
companying text. It is this error of purpose that lies at the heart of the fundamental flaw of
both the Lemon and endorsement analyses.
188 Id. at 3100. Justice Blackman stated:
Our subsequent decisions further have refined the definition of governmental
action that unconstitutionally advances religion. In recent years, we have paid
particularly close attention to whether the challenged governmental practice ei-
ther has the purpose or effect of "endorsing" religion, a concern that has long had
a place in our Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
Id. (emphasis added).
" Id. at 3103 (citation omitted).
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comprised a series of figures and objects, each group of which had
its own focal point. Santa's house and his reindeer were objects of
attention separate from the creche, and had their specific visual
story to tell. Similarly, whatever a "talking" wishing well may be,
it obviously was a center of attention separate from the creche.
Here, in contrast, the creche stands alone: it is the single element
of the display on the Grand Staircase.
Furthermore, the creche sits on the Grand Staircase, the
"main" and "most beautiful part" of the building that is the seat
of county government. No viewer could reasonably think that it
occupies this location without the support and approval of gov-
ernment. Thus, by permitting the "display of the creche in this
particular physical setting," the county sends an unmistakable
message that it supports and promotes the Christian praise to
God that is the creche's religious message.190
Accordingly, Justice Blackmun ruled that "[t]he display of the
creche in this context ... must be permanently enjoined." 191
Although the city undoubtedly advanced as much, if not more,
public funding in support of the menorah as it did for the
creche, 19' Justice Blackmun distinguished the menorah display.
Noting that the eighteen foot menorah stood next to both a forty-
five foot tall Christmas tree and a sign bearing "Salute to Liberty,"
Justice Blackmun, in a portion of his opinion in which no other
Justice joined, found this setting sufficient to insulate the menorah
from constitutional offensiveness. 193
190 Id. at 3103-04 (citations & footnotes omitted). Justice Blackmun continued in a
footnote:
The presence of Santas or other Christmas decorations elsewhere in the County
Courthouse, and of the nearby gallery forum, fail to negate the endorsement effect
of the creche. The record demonstrates clearly that the creche, with its floral
frame, was its own display distinct from any other decorations or exhibitions in
the building.
Id. at 3103 n.48.
Id. at 3105.
192 The City of Pittsburgh stored the creche in the basement of the county courthouse,
supplied a dolly and minimal aid to transport it to and from the basement, and decorated it
with plants and evergreens. See id. at 3097; see also supra text accompanying note 179.
193 See id. at 3112-15. According to Justice Blackmun:
The tree ... is clearly the predominant element in the city's display. The 45-
foot tree occupies the central position beneath the middle archway in front of the
Grant Street entrance to the City-County Building; the 18-foot menorah is posi-
tioned to one side. Given this configuration, it is much more sensible to interpret
the meaning of the menorah in light of the tree, rather than vice versa. In the
shadow of the tree, the menorah is readily understood as simply a recognition that
Christmas is not the only traditional way of observing the winter-holiday season.
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Coupled with this "as refined by endorsement Lemon" analy-
sis, Justice Blackmun introduced a novel, but equally historically
and constitutionally unsupportable, consideration to establishment
clause jurisprudence: the "less religious in nature alternative"
test.94 Justice Blackmun suggested that under this test he might
find what he feels to be an otherwise unencroaching display viola-
tive of establishment principles if there was, in his opinion, a "less
religious" symbol that could have been used.195 In addition to the
constitutional frailty of this consideration, it is fraught with practi-
cal concerns rivaling those raised by Lemon that could, if adopted,
throw establishment clause analysis into an even more chaotic
state.
Justice Blackmun, in a portion of his opinion joined by a ma-
jority of the Court, wrote a scathing response to Justice Kennedy's
opinion. 96 Justice Kennedy expressly rejected an endorsement
analysis and urged that the establishment clause be interpreted in
light of historical practices. 197 In particular, Justice Blackmun took
issue with the suggestion that
Marsh [v. Chambers] legitimates all "practices with no greater
potential for an establishment of religion" than those "accepted
In these circumstances, then, the combination of the tree and the menorah com-
municates, not a simultaneous endorsement of both Christian and Jewish faith,
but instead, a secular celebration of Christmas coupled with an acknowledgement
of Chanukah as a contemporaneous alternative tradition.
The Mayor's sign further diminishes the possibility that the tree and the me-
norah will be interpreted as a dual endorsement of Christianity and Judaism. The
sign states that during the holiday season the city salutes liberty. Moreover, the
sign draws upon the theme of light, common to both Chanukah and Christmas as
winter festivals, and links that theme with this Nation's legacy of freedom, which
allows an American to celebrate the holiday season in whatever way he wishes,
religiously or otherwise. While no sign can disclaim an overwhelming message of
endorsement, an "explanatory plaque" may confirm that in particular contexts the
government's association with a religious symbol does not represent the govern-
ment's sponsorship of religious beliefs. Here, the Mayor's sign serves to confirm
what the context already reveals: that the display of the menorah is not an en-
dorsement of religious faith but simply a recognition of cultural diversity.
Given all these considerations, it is not "sufficiently likely" that residents of
Pittsburgh will perceive the combined display of the tree, the sign, and the meno-
rah as an "endorsement," or "disapproval... of their individual religious choices."
Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3113-15 (citations & footnotes omitted).
194 See id. at 3114.
See id.
196 Id. at 3105-09.
197 Id. at 3134-46 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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traditions dating back to the Founding." Otherwise .... Justice
[Kennedy] asserts, such practices as our national motto ("In God
We Trust") and our Pledge of Allegiance (with the phrase "under
God," added in 1954) are in danger of invalidity. 98
Justice Blackmun's reply was that throughout history there have
been "numerous examples of official acts that endorsed Christian-
ity specifically,"' 99 and that simply because the establishment
clause's command for neutralism has been breached in the past
does not serve to diminish that command.20
Justice Blackmun's "concern" is unfounded. The establish-
ment clause, as evidenced by its incorporation, will never be inter-
preted in the exact manner that was intended. Thus, there is no
reason that the policy underlying the establishment clause cannot
be read to require that all religions be treated nonpreferentially.
Justice Blackmun's effort to distinguish Marsh is also unper-
suasive. According to Justice Blackmun, "[w]e need not return to
the subject of 'ceremonial deism' because there is an obvious dis-
tinction between creche displays and references to God in the
motto and the pledge."'20 1 The distinction, however, is that the
motto and the pledge are seen or heard by millions of people every
day, while the view of the creche display is limited to perhaps
thousands over a several week period. If anything, this distinction
would require, under Justice Blackmun's analysis, a finding of un-
constitutionality on both fronts.0 2 Moreover, one cannot ignore
the fact that the references to God in the motto and the pledge
are, like the creche, references to Christianity in general. Justice
Blackmun's effort to distinguish Marsh is irreconcilable with the
concept of neutralism that he and the rest of the Allegheny major-
ity advocate.
b. Justice O'Connor on the Menorah
Justice O'Connor concurred in the fall of the creche for the
same reasons enunciated by Justice Blackmun. 0 3 Her analysis of
the constitutionality of the menorah, however, was somewhat
different.
19 Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3106 (citations omitted).
199 Id.
290 Id. at 3107.
'0' Id. at 3106 (citation omitted).
202 See id. at 3139 n.4 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
20' See Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3117-19 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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In a portion of her opinion in which no other Justice joined,
Justice O'Connor expressly rejected Justice Blackmun's concern
over the secularizing of a religious holiday 04 and his less religious
alternative analysis,2 05 and focused solely on the question of
whether the menorah display, "next to a Christmas tree and a sign
saluting liberty sends a message of government endorsement of Ju-
daism or whether it sends a message of pluralism and freedom to
choose one's own beliefs."20 8Applying her context determinative
test, as she has done fairly consistently since Lynch, and invoking
the same museum analogy from Lynch, Justice O'Connor found
the menorah display to be constitutional.2 °7
Like Justice Blackmun, Justice O'Connor also felt compelled
to address Justice Kennedy's comments that if the endorsement
test "were 'applied without artificial exceptions for historical prac-
tice,' it would invalidate many traditional practices recognizing the
role of religion in our society."208 Justice O'Connor specifically
mentioned the existence of legislative prayers and the opening of
Court sessions with "God save the United States and this honor-
204 Id. at 3122 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
11 Id. at 3124 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
20 Id. at 3122 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor, as she did in Lynch, down-
played the significance of the first Lemon prong:
Regardless of the plausibility of a putative governmental purpose, the more im-
portant inquiry here is whether the governmental display of a minority faith's
religious symbol could ever reasonably be understood to convey a message of en-
dorsement of that faith. A menorah standing alone at city hall may well send such
a message to nonadherents, just as in this case the creche standing alone at the
Allegheny County Courthouse sends a message of governmental endorsement of
Christianity, whatever the county's purpose in authorizing the display may have
been. Thus, the question here is whether Pittsburgh's holiday display conveys a
message of endorsement of Judaism, when the menorah is the only religious sym-
bol in the combined display and when the opinion acknowledges that the tree
cannot reasonably be understood to convey an endorsement of Christianity.
Id. at 3123 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
207 Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3123 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor stated
that the combination of the tree, menorah, and sign conveyed a "distinct" message of plu-
ralism and freedom. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). The sign stated, "[dluring this holiday
season, the City of Pittsburgh salutes liberty. Let these festive lights remind us that we are
the keepers of the flame of liberty and our legacy of freedom." Id. at 3095. Justice O'Connor
then added that this particular physical setting "changes what viewers may fairly under-
stand to be the purpose of the display-as a typical museum setting, though not neutraliz-
ing the religious content of a religious painting, negates any message of endorsement of that
content." Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
200 Id. at 3120 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also id. at 3142 (Kennedy, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part).
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able Court. '209 Referring to her concurring opinion in Lynch, she
stated:
These examples of ceremonial deism do not survive Establish-
ment Clause scrutiny simply by virtue of their historical longevity
alone....
Under the endorsement test, the "history and ubiquity" of a
practice is relevant not because it creates an "artificial exception"
from that test. On the contrary, the "history and ubiquity" of a
practice is relevant because it provides part of the context in
which a reasonable observer evaluates whether a challenged gov-
ernmental practice conveys a message of endorsement of religion.
It is the combination of the longstanding existence of practices
such as opening legislative sessions with legislative prayers or
opening Court sessions with "God save the United States and this
honorable Court," as well as their nonsectarian nature, that lead
me to the conclusion that those particular practices, despite their
religious roots, do not convey a message of endorsement of partic-
ular religious beliefs.210
As was Justice Blackmun's explanation, Justice O'Connor's ef-
forts to secularize such practices is disingenuous. It is difficult to
understand how "God" can be given a secular meaning; when such
or similar reference is made, it is ridiculous to suggest that the
speaker did not intend religious significance or that the listener
perceived the reference to be to a favorite pet.
c. The "Near Absolutists"
Justice Brennan (joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens)
and Justice Stevens (joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall)
wrote separate opinions concurring in the fall of the creche and
dissenting from the stand of the menorah. While Justices Brennan
and Stevens joined Justice O'Connor's concurrence in which she
attempted to justify the use of the endorsement test,211 their opin-
209 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting her opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668, 693 (1984)).
210 Id. at 3121.
211 In part II of her opinion, Justice O'Connor responded to Justice Kennedy's assertion
"that the endorsement test 'is flawed in its fundamentals and unworkable in practice'" by
suggesting that "[a]s a theoretical matter, the endorsement test captures the essential com-
mand of the Establishment Clause, namely, that government must not make a person's reli-
gious beliefs relevant to their standing in the political community by conveying a message
'that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred.' "Id. at 3119 (O'Connor,
J., concurring) (citations omitted). As for the practical considerations, Justice O'Connor re-
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ions made it clear that they were much more willing to strike down
a government activity if any part of it had religious significance. In
a case such as Allegheny, for instance, they would be more apt to
find that the symbols having religious significance corrupt the sec-
ular aspects of the display rather than to find that the secular as-
pects of the display sanitize the religious symbols.
In finding against the menorah, Justice Brennan explained
that "the display of an object that 'retains a specifically Christian
[or other] religious meaning,' is incompatible with the separation
of church and state demanded by our Constitution."2 2 Justice
Brennan concluded that the menorah retained its religious signifi-
cance next to the tree; in fact, he concluded that the menorah
"dominate[d] the tree. '21 3 Justice Stevens noted that, in his opin-
ion, "the Establishment Clause should be construed to create a
strong presumption against the display of religious symbols on
public property. '21 4 Justice Stevens, however, carefully added that
this did not mean that he was retreating from his position that the
wall between public funding and religion should be kept "high and
impregnable.121 5 Similar to Justice Brennan, Justice Stevens con-
cluded that "the presence of the Chanukah menorah, unquestion-
ably a religious symbol, gives religious significance to the Christ-
mas tree.121 6 Justice Stevens also cited bits and pieces of legislative
history in an effort to support his belief that the establishment
clause mandates neutralism, and added the following novel
comment:
plied: "[w]e cannot avoid the obligation to draw lines, often close and difficult lines, in de-
ciding Establishment Clause cases, and that is not a problem unique to the endorsement
test." Id. at 3120 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
21 Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3124 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(citation omitted) (emphasis added) (quoting from his dissenting opinion in Lynch v. Don-
nelly, 465 U.S. at 708).
212 Id. at 3127 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
214 Id. at 3131 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
215 Id. at 3131 n.7 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Id. at 3133 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (footnote omitted).
This provoked Justice Stevens to find:
The overall display thus manifests governmental approval of the Jewish and
Christian religions. Although it conceivably might be interpreted as sending "a
message of pluralism and freedom to choose one's own beliefs," the message is not
sufficiently clear to overcome the strong presumption that the display, respecting
two religions to the exclusion of all others, is the very kind of double establish-
ment that the First Amendment was designed to outlaw.
Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3133-34 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (cita-
tions omitted).
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It is also significant that the final draft [of the establishment
clause] contains the word "respecting." Like "touching, .... re-
specting" means concerning, or with reference to. But it also
means with respect-that is, "reverence," "goodwill," "re-
gard"-to. Taking into account this richer meaning, the Estab-
lishment Clause, in banning laws that concern religion, especially
prohibits those that pay homage to religion.217
A complete historical examination surrounding the establishment
clause reveals the errors in Justice Stevens' logic.218
d. A United Four
Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Jus-
tices White and Scalia, authored a stinging dissent expressing dis-
satisfaction with Lemon in general21 and the endorsement test in
particular.220 Justice Kennedy stated that it was not necessary to
reach that decision because even under Lemon both the creche and
menorah were constitutionally permissible.221
Justice Kennedy clearly expressed the belief that when analyz-
ing challenged activity under the establishment clause, "the mean-
ing of the Clause is to be determined by reference to historical
practices and understandings. Whatever test we choose to apply
must permit not only legitimate practices two centuries old but
also any other practices with no greater potential for an establish-
ment of religion. 22 2 According to Justice Kennedy, the endorse-
ment test, like Lemon, received a failing score:
If the endorsement test, applied without artificial exceptions
for historical practice, reached results consistent with history, my
21 Id. at 3130-31 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
218 See supra notes 16-76 and accompanying text.
... Justice Kennedy stated that he was "content for present purposes to remain within
the Lemon framework," which the "majority applie[d] ... to judge the constitutionality of
the holiday displays here in question," but that he did "not wish to be seen as advocating,
let alone adopting, that test as [the Court's] primary guide in this difficult area." Allegheny,
109 S. Ct. at 3134 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
220 Id. at 3140-46 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
221 According to Justice Kennedy:
Substantial revision of our Establishment Clause doctrine may be in order; but it
is unnecessary to undertake that task today, for even the Lemon test, when ap-
plied with proper sensitivity to our traditions and our caselaw, supports the con-
clusion that both the creche and the menorah are permissible displays in the con-
text of the holiday season.
Id. at 3134 (Kennedy, J., concurrng in part, dissenting in part).
222 Id. at 3142 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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objections to it would have less force. But, as I understand that
test, the touchstone of an Establishment Clause violation is
whether nonadherents would be made to feel like "outsiders" by
government recognition or accommodation of religion. Few of our
traditional practices recognizing the part religion plays in our so-
ciety can withstand scrutiny under a faithful application of this
formula.
Some examples suffice to make plain my concerns. Since the
Founding of our Republic, American Presidents have issued
Thanksgiving Proclamations establishing a national day of cele-
bration and prayer. The first such proclamation was issued by
President Washington at the request of the First Congress, and
"recommend[ed] and assign[ed]" a day "to be devoted by the
people of these States to the service of that great and glorious
Being who is the beneficent author of all the good that was, that
is, or that will be," so that "we may then unite in most humbly
offering our prayers and supplications to the great Lord and
Ruler of Nations, and beseech Him to... promote the knowledge
and practice of true religion and virtue. . . ." Most of President
Washington's successors have followed suit, and the forthrightly
religious nature of these proclamations has not waned with the
years. President Franklin D. Roosevelt went so far as to "suggest
a nationwide reading of the Holy Scriptures during the period
from Thanksgiving Day to Christmas" so that "we may bear more
earnest witness to our gratitude to Almighty God." It requires lit-
tle imagination to conclude that these proclamations would cause
nonadherents to feel excluded, yet they have been a part of our
national heritage from the beginning.
The Executive has not been the only Branch of our Govern-
ment to recognize the central role of religion in our society. The
fact that this Court opens its sessions with the request that "God
save the United States and this honorable Court" has been noted
elsewhere. The Legislature has gone much further, not only em-
ploying legislative chaplains, but also setting aside a special
prayer room in the Capitol for use by Members of the House and
Senate. The room is decorated with a large stained glass panel
that depicts President Washington kneeling in prayer; around
him is etched the first verse of the 16th Psalm: "Preserve me, 0
God, for in Thee do I put my trust." Beneath the panel is a ros-
trum on which a Bible is placed; next to the rostrum is an Ameri-
can Flag. Some endorsement is inherent in these reasonable ac-
commodations, yet the Establishment Clause does not forbid
them.
The United States Code itself contains religious references
that would be suspect under the endorsement test. Congress has
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directed the President to "set aside and proclaim a suitable day
each year... as a National Day of Prayer, on which the people of
the United States may turn to God in prayer and meditation at
churches, in groups, and as individuals." This statute does not
require anyone to pray, of course, but is a staightforward endorse-
ment of the concept of "turn[ing] to God in prayer." Also by stat-
ute, the Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag describes the United
States as "one Nation under God." To be sure, no one is obligated
to recite this phrase, but it borders on sophistry to suggest that
the "'reasonable'" atheist would not feel less than a "'full
membe[r] of the political community'" every time his fellow
Americans recited, as part of their expression of patriotism and
love for country, a phrase he believed to be false. Likewise, our
national motto, "In God we Trust," which is prominently en-
graved in the wall above the Speaker's dias in the Chamber of the
House of Representatives and is reproduced on every coin minted
and every dollar printed by the Federal Government, must have
the same effect.22 3
Justice Kennedy also rejected a literal application of the language
in past cases that suggests the establishment clause mandates
"neutralism. 224
Justice Kennedy then suggested an appropriate approach for
223 Id. at 3142-43 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (footnotes & cita-
tions omitted).
224 Id. at 3135 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). As Justice Kennedy
explained:
Taken to its logical extreme, some of the language [in prior cases] would require a
relentless extirpation of all contact between government and religion. But that is
not the history or the purpose of the Establishment Clause. Government policies
of accommodation, acknowledgment, and support for religion are an accepted part
of our political and cultural heritage.
Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice Kennedy continued:
If government is to participate in its citizens' celebration of a holiday that con-
tains both a secular and a religious component, enforced recognition of only the
secular aspect would signify the callous indifference toward religious faith that our
cases and traditions do not require; for by commemorating the holiday only as it is
celebrated by nonadherents, the government would be refusing to acknowledge
the plain fact, and the historical reality, that many of its citizens celebrate its
religious aspects as well. Judicial invalidation of government's attempts to recog-
nize the religious underpinnings of the holiday would signal not neutrality but a
pervasivelintent to insulate government from all things religious. The Religion
Clauses do not require government to acknowledge these holidays or their reli-
gious component; but our strong tradition of government accommodation and ac-
knowledgment permits government to do so.
Id. at 3138 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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addressing the second Lemon prong.2 25 He would find the principal
or primary effect of challenged governmental activity to be the ad-
vancement or inhibition of religion if it "coerce[s] anyone to sup-
port or participate in any religion or its exercise; [or] in the guise
of avoiding hostility or callous indifference, give[s] direct benefits
to religion in such a degree that it in fact 'establishes a [state] reli-
gion or religious faith, or tends to do so.' ,,226 On the facts before
him, Justice Kennedy found that neither the creche nor the meno-
rah displays were an exercise by the government of its power of
coercion, nor did they directly benefit religion to an impermissible
degree.227
225 Like Justice Blackmun, Justice Kennedy found "[t]he only Lemon factor implicated
in this case [to be] whether the 'principal or primary effect' of the challenged government
practice is 'one that neither advances nor inhibits religion.'" Id. at 3134 (Kennedy, J., con-
curring in part, dissenting in part) (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612).
226 Id. at 3136 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (quoting Lynch, 465
U.S. at 678). Justice Kennedy suggested various forms of impermissible coercion: "taxation
to supply the substantial benefits that would sustain a state-established faith, direct com-
pulsion to observance, or governmental exhortation to religiosity that amounts in fact to
proselytizing." Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
22 Id. at 3139 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). According to Justice
Kennedy:
There is no suggestion here that the government's power to coerce has been
used to further the interests of Christianity or Judaism in any way. No one was
compelled to observe or participate in any religious ceremony or activity. Neither
the city nor the county contributed significant amounts of tax money to serve the
cause of one religious faith. The creche and the menorah are purely passive sym-
bols of religious holidays. Passersby who disagree with the message conveyed by
these displays are free to ignore them, or even to turn their backs, just as they are
free to do when they disagree with any other form of government speech.
There is no realistic risk that the creche or the menorah represent an effort to
proselytize or are otherwise the first step down the road to an establishment of
religion. Lynch is dispositive of this claim with respect to the creche, and I find no
reason for reaching a different result with respect to the menorah. Both are the
traditional symbols of religious holidays that over time have acquired a secular
component. Without ambiguity, Lynch instructs that the "focus of our inquiry
must be on the [religious symbol] in the context of the [holiday] season." In that
context, religious displays that serve "to celebrate the Holiday and to depict the
origins of that Holiday" give rise to no Establishment Clause concern. If Congress
and the state legislatures do not run afoul of the Establishment Clause when they
begin each day with a state-sponsored prayer for divine guidance offered by a
chaplain whose salary is paid at government expense, I cannot comprehend how a
menorah or a creche, displayed in the limited context of the holiday season, can be
invalid.
Id. (citations omitted).
Justice Kennedy also took issue with what he believed to be the majority's failure to
recognize Lynch as being dispositive on the outcome of the case. Kennedy rejected the at-
tempt to distinguish Lynch on the ground that the display in Lynch was not located on
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While Justice Kennedy's rejection of the endorsement and
government property and was surrounded by secular ornaments such as candy canes and
reindeer. As Justice Kennedy explained:
Nothing in Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the Court in Lynch provides support
for these purported distinctions. After describing the facts, the Lynch opinion
makes no mention of either of these factors. It concentrates instead on the signifi-
cance of the creche as part of the entire holiday season. Indeed, it is clear that the
Court did not view the secular aspects of the display as somehow subduing the
religious message conveyed by the creche, for the majority expressly rejected the
dissenters' suggestion that it sought "'to explain away the clear religious import
of the creche'" or had "equated the creche with a Santa's house or reindeer."
Crucial to the Court's conclusion was not the number, prominence, or type of sec-
ular items contained in the holiday display but the simple fact that, when dis-
played by government during the Christmas season, a creche presents no realistic
danger of moving government down the forbidden road toward an establishment
of religion. Whether the creche be surrounded by poinsettias, talking wishing
wells, or carolers, the conclusion remains the same, for the relevant context is not
the items in the display itself but the season as a whole.
The fact that the crbche and menorah are both located on government prop-
erty, even at the very seat of government, is likewise inconsequential. In the first
place, the Lynch Court did not rely on the fact that the setting for Pawtucket's
display was a privately owned park, and it is difficult to suggest that anyone could
have failed to receive a message of government sponsorship after observing Santa
Clause ride the city fire engine to the park to join with the Mayor of Pawtucket in
inaugurating the holiday season by turning on the lights of the city-owned display.
Indeed, the District Court in Lynch found that "people might reasonably mistake
the Park for public property," and rejected as "frivolous" the suggestion that the
display was not directly associated with the city.
Our cases do not suggest, moreover, that the use of public property necessa-
rily converts otherwise permissible government conduct into an Establishment
Clause violation. To the contrary, in some circumstances the First Amendment
may require that government property be available for use by religious groups,
and even where not required, such use has long been permitted. The prayer ap-
proved in Marsh v. Chambers, for example, was conducted in the legislative cham-
ber of the State of Nebraska, surely the single place most likely to be thought the
center of state authority.
Nor can I comprehend why it should be that placement of a government-
owned crbche on private land is lawful while placement of a privately owned
crbche on public land is not. If anything, I should have thought government own-
ership of a religious symbol presented the more difficult question under the Estab-
lishment Clause, but as Lynch resolved that question to sustain the government
action, the sponsorship here ought to be all the easier to sustain. In short, nothing
about the religious displays here distinguishes them in any meaningful way from
the creche we permitted in Lynch.
If Lynch is still good law-and until today it was-the judgment below can-
not stand. I accept and indeed approve both the holding and the reasoning of
Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Lynch, and so I must dissent from the judgment
that the creche display is unconstitutional. On the same reasoning, I agree that
the menorah display is constitutional.
Id. at 3139-40 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (footnote & citations
omitted).
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Lemon rationales is founded on sound historical and constitutional
reasoning, his coercion test confuses establishment clause jurispru-
dence. As Justice O'Connor suggested, coercion should be left as
part of a free exercise analysis. 2s The key to establishment clause
scrutiny is nonpreferentialism; introducing coercion into that de-
termination only serves to further muddy the waters in this al-
ready polluted area of the law.
D. Where They Sit
While the Court's most recent establishment clause decisions
have done little to alleviate the chaotic state of the law in this
area, they provide some insight into the attitudes of the individual
Court members. Justice O'Connor has expressed concern over the
inconsistencies resulting from the application of Lemon.229 Al-
though Justice O'Connor does not appear "ready to abandon all
aspects of the Lemon test, '230 she has indicated "that the stan-
dards announced in Lemon should be reexamined and refined in
order to make them more useful in achieving the underlying pur-
poses of the First Amendment. 213 1 However, Justice O'Connor's
suggested analysis is historically and constitutionally unsound. She
advocates an approach that would focus on "whether government's
purpose is to endorse religion and whether the statute actually
conveys a message of endorsement." 23 2 Under O'Connor's "en-
dorsement" analysis, "nonpreferential" governmental action could
be held unconstitutional.
Similarly, while Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, and
Stevens seem content with invoking Lemon in all establishment
clause cases, they will utilize Justice O'Connor's endorsement test
to analyze governmental activity under the "purpose" and "ef-
233Bfects" prongs. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens are more
"I Id. at 3119 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
223 (1963).
22 Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 346 (1987)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("this action ... illustrates certain difficulties inherent in ...
Lemon"); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 68 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Despite its
initial promise, the Lemon test has proved problematic").
23 Wallace, 472 U.S. at 68 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
231 Id. at 68-69 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
232 Id. at 69 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see Amos, 483 U.S. at 348 (O'Connor, J., con-
curring) (restatement of endorsement analysis).
233 See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3115 (1989) (opinion of Justice
Blackmun); Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 109 S. Ct. 890, 896-97 n.1 (1989) (Justice Bren-
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apt to find an establishment clause violation utilizing the Lemon
and endorsement rationales than are Justices Blackmun and
O'Connor. s4
While Justice White has joined2'5 and concurred 236 in applying
the Lemon test, and has written for the Court applying Lemon, s7
nan, joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens, cited a prior O'Connor opinion describing the
endorsement test).
Although Justice Blackmun applied Justice O'Connor's endorsement analysis in Alle-
gheny to determine whether the creche and menorah displays violated constitutional princi-
ples, he did not disregard Lemon. This was clear when he stated that although "[a] display
[might] not have [the] effect of endorsing religious faith, [this] does not foreclose the possi-
bility that the display ... might violate either the 'purpose' or 'entanglement' prong of the
Lemon analysis." Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3115. Justice Blackmun also indicated that he
would apply the endorsement test to determine whether the challenged activity violated the
first Lemon prong by asserting that "[i]n recent years, [the Court has] paid particularly
close attention to whether the challenged governmental practice either has the purpose or
effect of 'endorsing' religion." Id. at 3100 (emphasis added). Likewise, Justice Brennan,
joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens, alluded to Justice O'Connor's endorsement analy-
sis while confirming their belief in the Lemon test in Bullock. Justice Brennan cited with
approval Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Wallace in which O'Connor stated that
"'Lemon's inquiry as to the purpose and effect of a statute requires courts to examine
whether government's purpose is to endorse religion and whether the statute actually con-
veys the message of endorsement.'" Bullock, 109 S. Ct. at 897 n.1 (plurality opinion); see
Wallace, 472 U.S. at 69 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
In Bullock, the state action at issue was a statute that exempted religious publications
from a Texas sales tax on publications. Bullock, 109 S. Ct. at 890 (plurality opinion); see
TEx. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.312 (Vernon 1982 & Supp. 1988). Justice Brennan, in striking
down the statute, stated that the state action was "a blatant endorsement of religion [which
appeared] to produce greater state entanglement with religion than the denial of an exemp-
tion." Bullock, 109 S. Ct. at 902 (plurality opinion). Without any traditional analysis, Jus-
tice Blackmun, joined by Justice O'Connor, concurred in the Bullock opinion on the ground
that "Texas engaged in preferential support for the communication of religious messages."
Id. at 907. (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Kennedy, dissented, finding that the statute was a permissible accommodation of
religion and did not violate Lemon. Id. at 907-16 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
234 See supra notes 229-33 and accompanying text (discussion of views expressed by
Justices O'Connor, Brennan, Marshall and Stevens).
235 See Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562, 2565-81 (1988). In Bowen, the federal Ado-
lescent Family Life Act, which provided federal funding to agencies dealing with premarital
adolescent sexual relations, was challenged as being a violation of the establishment clause.
487 U.S. at 589. This issue arose because several recipients were "organizations with institu-
tional ties to religious denominations." 108 S. Ct. at 2564. The Bowen majority applied the
three-part Lemon test and concluded that while the statute was constitutional on its face, a
further factfinding was necessary to determine if it was constitutional "as applied." 108 S.
Ct. at 2562, 2579-81.
"I See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 608-10 (1987) (White, J., concurring) (Loui-
siana statute requiring public schools to teach creation science if evolution is taught violates
Lemon's purpose prong).
2317 See Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334-40 (stat-
utory exemption under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 satisfied the Lemon test).
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he has indicated that he is ready and willing to reconsider the
Court's decisions interpreting the establishment clause .1 3  Chief
Justice Rehnquist has gone even further and indicated that he is
willing to scrap the Lemon test in favor of a historically justified
approach to such issues. 39 As for the newer Court members, Jus-
tice Kennedy has indicated that at the very least he is not willing
to read Lemon as broadly as the Allegheny majority240 and has
suggested that he too is ready to relegate Lemon to the archives of
constitutional jurisprudence.2 4 1 Likewise, Justice Scalia, citing the
historical analysis of Chief Justice Rehnquist in Wallace v. Jaffree,
has indicated that at a minimum the "purpose" prong of Lemon
should be abandoned,242 and, by joining in Justice Kennedy's opin-
ion in Allegheny, has suggested that Lemon should be abandoned
altogether.243
Presently, there are not enough votes on the Court to relegate
Lemon to the mantel of misbegotten constitutional doctrine. How-
ever, one more vote apparently is all that is needed to stock the
shelf.2 44
"' See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 90-91 (White, J., dissenting). In his dissenting opinion in
Wallace, Justice White stated: "I have been out of step with many of the Court's decisions
dealing with this subject matter, and it is thus not surprising that I would support a basic
reconsideration of our precedents." Id. at 91 (White, J., dissenting).
"I See id. at 91-114 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). After stating that the Lemon test "rep-
resents a determined effort to craft a workable rule from a historically faulty doctrine," id.
at 110 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), Justice Rehnquist concluded that "[tihe true meaning of
the Establishment Clause can only be seen in its history." Id. at 113 (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing). This view is supported by the fact that Rehnquist joined Justice O'Connor's dissent in
Aguilar and Justice Kennedy's opinion in Allegheny. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU,
109 S. Ct. 3086, 3134-35 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); Aguilar
v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 421-31 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (criticizing Lemon).
240 See Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3134-46 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part). In Allegheny, Justice Kennedy made it clear that he did not want "to be seen as
advocating, let alone adopting, [the Lemon] test as [the] primary guide in this difficult
area." Id. at 3134 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
241 Id. at 3134 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("Substantial revi-
sion of... Establishment Clause doctrine may be in order").
242 See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 635-640 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (advocating
abandoning Lemon's purpose test).
202 See Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3134-46 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part); see also supra notes 219-27 and accompanying text (discussion of Justice Kennedy's
position).
24 The Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on the establishment clause was
in Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 110 S. Ct. 688 (1990). In that case,
Jimmy Swaggart Ministries, a religious organization incorporated as a Louisiana nonprofit
corporation conducted evangelic crusades across the country (including California), sold reli-
gious and nonreligious merchandise at the crusades, and published nationwide a monthly
98 ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:1:41
VII. A SUGGESTED HISTORICALLY JUSTIFIABLE APPROACH TO
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE ANALYSIS
The doctrine of stare decisis mandates that once incorporated
into the fourteenth amendment, the establishment clause will re-
magazine called "The Evangelist." Id. The California Board of Equalization informed the
Ministries that religious materials were not exempt from California sales tax and requested
the Ministries to register as a seller to facilitate the reporting and payment of the tax; the
Board also found that the Ministries had a sufficient nexus with California to require the
Ministries to collect and report use tax on its mail order sales to California purchasers. Id.
When the Ministries failed to follow the Board's instructions, the Board notified the Minis-
tries of the dollar amounts of sales and use tax owed and the assessed penalty. Id. While it
did not dispute the amounts owed respecting the nonreligious items, the Ministries filed a
petition to redetermine the tax on the religious materials-claiming that the tax violated the
free exercise and establishment clauses. Id. The Board denied the Ministries' argument (al-
though it deleted the penalty and increased the interest charges) and the California Court of
Appeals affirmed (the California Supreme Court denied discretionary review). Id. The Su-
preme Court, in a unanimous opinion by Justice O'Connor, affirmed. Id.
After rejecting the Ministries' free exercise challenge, id. at 693-97, the Court turned to
the establishment clause challenge that the application of the sales and use tax to the Min-
istries' religious materials fostered an excessive government entanglement with religion. Id.
at 697. The Ministries' establishment clause argument was that applying the tax resulted in
on-site inspections of the Ministries' crusades, lengthy on site audits, examinations of the
Ministries' books and records, and threats of criminal prosecution and other legal problems.
Id. After noting "it is undeniable that a generally applicable tax has a secular purpose and
neither advances nor inhibits religion, for the very essence of such a tax is that it is neutral
and nondiscriminatory on questions of religious belief," id. at 698, and that the Lemon en-
tanglement prong had drawn recent criticism from the Court, Justice O'Connor rejected the
Ministries' contention. Id. at 698-99. According to Justice O'Connor: "From the State's
point of view, the critical question is not whether the materials are religious, but whether
there is a sale or a use, a question which involves only a secular determination." Id. at 699.
Justice O'Connor also noted that the Court has held that while "[c]ollection and payment of
the tax will of course require some contact [with] ... the State... [the Court has] held that
generally applicable administrative and record-keeping regulations may be imposed on reli-
gious organization[s] without running afoul of the Establishment Clause." Id. at 698 (cita-
tion omitted).
The most that can be gleaned from this case is that all of the Justices are dissatisfied
with the Lemon entanglement prong. One should not read this case, however, as meaning
that Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and to a lesser extent Justice
White have changed their tunes on this issue. As Justice Kennedy has said, "[t]he Religion
Clauses do not require government to acknowledge [religious activities]; but our strong tra-
dition of government accommodation and acknowledgment permits government to do so."
Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3138 (footnote omitted) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part). In Jimmy Swaggart Ministries, there was no government accommodation of reli-
gion at issue. In fact, at issue was whether government could treat a religious organization
like nonreligious organizations for tax purposes. Thus, as Justice O'Connor noted, "whatever
the precise contours of the Establishment Clause .... its undisputed core values are not
even remotely called into question by the generally applicable tax in this case." Jimmy
Swaggart Ministries, 110 S. Ct. at 698 (citations omitted). There is little doubt, given their
prior opinions, however, that the "core values" of the establishment clause mean different
things to the different Justices.
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main forever incorporated. Notwithstanding the irony of incorpo-
rating the establishment clause into the fourteenth amendment
and making it applicable to the states,245 the issue of incorporation
is a moot point. The focus must then turn to how to apply the
establishment clause in a way least offensive to its intended
purpose.
A detailed historical review into the purpose and meaning of
the establishment clause reveals that it was a federalism compro-
mise designed to ensure the rights of the states to legislate on mat-
ters of religious import.246 In terms of a limitation, the establish-
ment clause was intended to prevent the creation of a national
church and the federal preference of one or more religious sects
over others;2 47 there was no intent to prohibit the encouragement
or furtherance by the federal government of religion by nonprefer-
entialist means. 248 It follows, then, that even though incorporated,
the establishment clause prohibits only the establishment of a na-
tional church or religion, or the preference by government of one
or more religious sects.
A proper analysis of establishment clause issues is one that
can embody these historically sound precepts while at the same
time bring a degree of consistency to an area of constitutional law
plagued by inconsistency. 249 These requirements would be met by
an analysis founded on the recognition that the establishment
clause allows for "practicable nonpreferential" assistance of reli-
gion.25° Such an analysis would necessarily involve two steps. The
24 See supra notes 123-27 and accompanying text (establishment clause originally
designed to protect states rights has become a restraint on such rights).
246 See supra notes 10-33 and accompanying text (detailed discussion of the historical
context surrounding the establishment clause).
24 See supra notes 10-29, 34-42 and accompanying text (historical analysis delineating
intent of establishment clause).
248 See supra notes 34-42 and accompanying text (discussion of nonpreferentialism).
249 See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 112-13 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (discus-
sion of inconsistencies in this area of law and need for historical analysis as basis of any
approach).
2'0 Even this analysis is a "stricter" limitation on federal action than that originally
intended. This is best illustrated by an examination of historically ingrained practices such
as: the opening legislative days with a prayer led by a chaplain compensated with public
funds; the compensation of military chaplains using public funds; the issuance of proclama-
tions of days of thanksgiving and of national prayer; and the invocation of God at the begin-
ning of Court sessions, in our Pledge of Allegiance, and on our currency. These practices
would withstand challenge under the true meaning of the establishment clause, but might
not under the suggested approach. Thus, any practice "blessed" under the "true spirit" of
the establishment clause should be upheld as constitutional.
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first consideration would be whether the challenged action is non-
preferential on its face. Conceivably, most actions would survive
such scrutiny. The second consideration would be whether all reli-
gions necessarily can be treated similarly. This part of the test
would require the party challenging the activity to present a fac-
tual showing that similar treatment is not possible. Absent such a
showing, the challenged governmental action would be deemed
constitutional.2 51 The requirement that nonpreferential assistance
be practicable should allay any fears that such assistance might
have preferentialist effects. For example, assume a city council
passed an ordinance providing that the city, upon request and on a
first-come, first-served basis, would repair churches within city
limits. If it could be shown that, given fiscal realities, the effects of
the ordinance would be that the city could not realistically, honor
all such requests, the ordinance would tend to have a preferential-
ist effect, thus violating the establishment clause. Consequently, an
It seems apparent that in Allegheny, a majority of Supreme Court Justices would disa-
gree with this reasoning. For example, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan, Mar-
shall, Stevens, and O'Connor, stated:
The history of this Nation, it is perhaps sad to say, contains numerous examples
of official acts that endorsed Christianity specifically . . . . Some of these exam-
ples date back to the Founding of the Republic, but this heritage of official dis-
crimination against non-Christians has no place in the jurisprudence of the Estab-
lishment Clause.
Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3106-07 (footnote & citation omitted). The explanation the Alle-
gheny majority offers for the constitutionality of the above-mentioned governmental prac-
tices is that there is a difference "between a specifically Christian symbol, like a creche, and
more general religious references, like the legislative prayers in Marsh." Id. at 3106; see
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786 (1983) (Court upheld prayer by state-funded chap-
lain). This suggestion was criticized by Justice Kennedy, who noted that the "purported
distinction is utterly inconsistent with the majority's belief that the Establishment Clause
'mean[s] no official preference even for religion over nonreligion.'" Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at
3139 n.4 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citation omitted).
Likewise, Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Brennan and Stevens, has remarked:
Practices such as legislative prayers or opening Court sessions with "God save the
United States and this honorable Court," serve the secular purposes of "solem-
nizing public occasions," and "expressing confidence in the future" . . . . These
examples of ceremonial deism do not survive Establishment Clause scrutiny sim-
ply by virtue of their historical longevity alone.
Id. at 3120-21 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citation omitted). However, Justice O'Connor's
"rational basis" justification of such governmental practices does not comport with the
statement made by the Allegheny majority's statement (in which she joined) that "we have
expressly required 'strict scrutiny' of practices suggesting 'a denominational preference.'"
Id. at 3109 (citation omitted).
251 The proposed remedy in instances in which all religions can be treated similarly, but
are not, would be either positive or negative injunctive relief.
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Everson-type statute2 52 would not withstand challenge under the
suggested analysis if it could be shown that the government could
not afford to reimburse all parents of every religious denomination
for transporting their children to parochial schools by public
means.
253
Under the suggested analysis, incongruous results stemming
from applying Lemon would be avoided, at least microgeographi-
cally. 254 Accordingly, by way of example, in the absence of a show-
ing that the apparent nonpreferential governmental action has a
preferentialist effect due to impracticability, the following pro-
grams, which have been held violative of the establishment clause
under Lemon, would withstand constitutional challenge: 1) supple-
menting parochial school teacher salaries; 2) a moment of silence
during the school day for meditation or voluntary prayer; 3) the
use of public school property by religious groups; 4) paying ex-
penses incurred by parochial school children on field trips; 5) lend-
ing teaching and testing materials by the state to parochial schools;
6) reimbursing church schools for expenses of state-required tests
and examinations; 7) allocating financial aid to repair church-sup-
ported schools; 8) displaying religious symbols on school property;
9) permitting public schools to provide released-time for religious
classes and services on school property; 10) providing tax relief for
tuition paid to parochial schools; and 11) state provided therapeu-
tic and diagnostic health services inside a church school.2"5
"I2 See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 3 (1947); see also supra notes 77-103 and
accompanying text (discussion of Everson statute that permitted public funding to reim-
burse parents for money expended in busing children to parochial schools).
"53 Some might argue that, instead of lending consistency to this area of the law, this
analysis could result in different outcomes under similar facts depending upon the geo-
graphical location of the constitutional challenge. This argument, however, ignores the con-
sistency of the analysis itself, as opposed to Lemon which is consistent in theory but not in
application. See supra text accompanying notes 136-62 (discussion of inconsistency in appli-
cation of Lemon and examples). Moreover, there are numerous examples in which different
results might occur depending on the location of the dispute. For instance, what may be a
reasonable time, place, and manner restriction for a rally and march in downtown New York
City might be unreasonable for a similar demonstration in downtown Salisbury, North Car-
olina. See Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 648-54
(1981) (state has interest in avoiding congestion and maintaining orderly movement). Essen-
tially, where the facts of different cases are truly "similar," the results under the suggested
approach will be consistent.
2 Different results on a macro level do not raise constitutional concerns because such
results would be based on geographic and societal factors rather than the underlying consti-
tutional interpretation. See supra note 249 and accompanying text (suggested analysis
would provide consistency in application).
215 See supra notes 136-62 and accompanying text (listing of inconsistent treatment of
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Use of the suggested analysis also would avoid resort to the
"variables" most recently applied by the Third Circuit and the Su-
preme Court majority (in Allegheny) in analyzing Lemon's "ef-
fects" prong. It appears certain that the variables approach would
produce even more irreconciable results than those already pro-
duced by Lemon. Under the variable approach in a case such as
Allegheny, the following questions would precede a constitutional
determination: If a display can be placed on government land but
not inside a government building, how far away from a government
building must the display be and where must it be located? Must
it be placed out of view of passersby? Must it be five, ten, one
hundred yards from the building? If the display cannot be placed
on government property, how far away from government property
must the display be: ten feet, ten yards, ten miles? If the display
must be "part of a larger configuration including nonreligious
items," how large must the secular aspects of the configuration be,
what types of nonreligious items must be included, and how close
to the religious symbols must they be? Must the nonreligious items
be two, three, four times as large as the religious symbols? Must
the nonreligious portion of the display be two, three, four times as
expansive as the religious portion? If the "religious intensity of the
display" is a factor, when does the intensity become constitution-
ally impermissible? Can the creche display contain fiqures of the
baby Jesus as well as the Virgin Mary and Joseph? What about
angels? If secular items are needed to diminish the intensity of the
display, is Frosty the Snowman sufficient or is Santa Claus also
required? Is one reindeer sufficient or is a herd essential? If "the
degree of public participation in the ownership and maintenance of
the display" is important, how much is too much? Does it take
$100, $200, or $300 to cross the line? What about "disclaimers of
public sponsorship"? Must the disclaimers be in writing or can
they be oral? If oral disclaimers are permissible, how many times
must they run? If written disclaimers are necessary, what types,
how big, how many are required and where must they be placed? 56
noted situations under Lemon).
256 Justice Kennedy recognized this problem in his opinion in Allegheny. 109 S. Ct.
3144-45 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). He believed that the test ar-
ticulated by the majority could "provide workable guidance to the lower courts . . . only
after [the] Court ha[d] decided a long series of holiday display cases, using little more than
intuition and a tape measure." Id. at 3144-45 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
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Under the suggested approach in a case such as Allegheny,
courts must first determine whether it is government policy to al-
low all religious groups to place displays on government property
during periods of religious significance. If not, the program is
facially preferential and violates the establishment clause. Even if
this first hurdle is cleared, those challenging the program can pre-
sent evidence that it is not "practicably nonpreferential." In an Al-
legheny-type case, such proof may be that there is insufficient
space at the given locale for all religious groups to place their dis-
plays at a particular time and allow the locale to maintain its func-
tionability.21 Absent any showing, however, the religious displays
(or other governmental action) would stand.
VIII. CONCLUSION
A historical misinterpretation of the intent of the establish-
ment clause has fundamentally flawed the current Supreme Court
analysis of establishment clause issues. The establishment clause
was not intended to mandate neutralism. In fact, the primary pur-
pose of the establishment clause was to protect state sovereignty
over religious matters from usurpation by the federal government.
The issue now is how to apply the clause in a way least offensive to
its intended purpose. The answer is the "practicably nonpreferen-
tial" analysis suggested in this Article. Besides being as historically
justifiable as possible, the suggested analysis will go far toward
yielding "unified and principled results in Establishment Clause
cases," 25 s which alone makes the suggested analysis an attractive
alternative to the "Lemon" currently utilized.
257 It would be insufficient to argue that there is not enough space for each church to
erect a display of its choice. Rather, it would suffice that each religious sect have an oppor-
tunity to participate.
258 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 106 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
1989]
I

